Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance by Abaramowicz, Michael & Henderson, M. Todd
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 82 | Issue 4 Article 1
4-1-2007
Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance
Michael Abaramowicz
M. Todd Henderson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Abaramowicz & M. T. Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1343 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol82/iss4/1
ARTICLES
PREDICTION MARKETS FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Michael Abramowicz* and M. Todd Hendersont
INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1344
I. A PRIMER ON CORPORATE P DIcrIoN MARKTS ............ 1349
A. Early Corporate Innovators ............................. 1349
B. Designs for Future Corporate Experimentation ............. 1350
1. Subsidized Markets with Automated Market
M akers .......................................... 1351
2. Conditional Markets ............................. 1353
C. Obstacles to Market Accuracy ........................... 1354
1. Inefficient Markets ............................... 1354
2. M anipulation .................................... 1355
3. Unlikely Conditions .............................. 1356
4. Unavailable Information ......................... 1357
5. M inor Decisions ................................. 1360
II. IMPROVING CORPORATE INFORMATION FLow ................ 1360
A. Flow of Information to the CEO and the Board ............ 1361
1. The Virtues and Limitations of Following Stock
Prices ............................................ 1361
2. Problems Impeding Information Flow ............ 1364
© 2007 Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson. Individuals and
nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any
format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the
authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision
and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., Amherst College.
t Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. J.D., University of
Chicago Law School; B.S.E., Princeton University.
For excellent comments and suggestions, we are grateful to the participants in a
workshop at the University of Chicago Law School, as well as to Larry Cunningham,
Robin Hanson, and Henry Manne.
1343
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
a. H ierarchy .................................... 1365
b. Hidden Profiles .............................. 1368
c. Heuristics and Biases ......................... 1368
B. Fow of Information to the Markets ...................... 1370
1. Prediction Markets Instead of Internal Controls .. 1370
2. Prediction Markets Instead of Insider Trading .... 1373
3. Prediction Markets Instead of More Disclosure
Regulation ....................................... 1375
C. Objections ....... ................................ 1378
1. W ealth Constraints ............................... 1379
2. Tim e H orizons ................................... 1380
3. W orkplace Culture ............................... 1381
4. Agency Costs ..................................... 1381
5. Sabotage ......................................... 1384
III. IMPROVING CORPORATE DECISIONMAKING ...................... 1385
A. Corporate Strategy ..................................... 1386
1. Shareholder Proposals ........................... 1386
2. Rules of the Gam e ............................... 1393
3. Takeovers and Other Major Corporate
Transactions ..................................... 1394
4. Prediction Markets Instead of Markets for Votes .. 1400
B. Personnel ............................................. 1402
1. Board Member Selection ......................... 1402
2. Manager Hiring and Firing ....................... 1404
3. Executive and Board Compensation .............. 1406
C. Creditors and Other Nonshareholder Constituencies ........ 1409
1. Creditors ........................................ 1410
2. Labor ............................................ 1412
CONCLUSION. .................................................... 1414
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance scholarship seeks to evaluate and suggest
legal mechanisms for improving governance and thus the welfare of
shareholders and (perhaps) other constituencies. Prevailing legal
approaches, however, avoid direct evaluation of substantive policy dis-
agreements. Consider, for example, the recent battle for control of
the H. J. Heinz Company Nelson Peltz, whose hedge fund has
invested in Heinz stock, wants five seats on its board of directors so
that he can put in place governance changes; CEO William Johnson
has resisted efforts to change the board.1 Corporate law knows little
I See Steven Gray, Ketchup Fight: Peltz, Heinz CEO Go at It, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2006, at C1.
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about ketchup. And so, it focuses on procedure to ensure that the
agents (Johnson and other managers) will act on behalf of principals
(Peltz, shareholders, and perhaps other stakeholders), for example by
regulating issues such as who pays the bills associated with share-
holder votes.
Stock markets evaluate the impact (and beneficiaries) of manage-
rial decisions more directly, providing real-time predictions of the dis-
counted future profits that corporations will produce. Changes in
stock price, however, have virtually no role in corporate governance.
A CEO and members of a board may take actions that they expect will
win the approval of the market, but neither statutes nor charters insist
that a corporation follow the market's advice. This may seem puz-
zling. A principal goal of corporate law is to maximize shareholder
wealth, and if stock market trends provide an objective, informed, and
speedy assessment of whether a corporation's decisions advance that
goal, then perhaps corporate law should take account of them in
some way.2
A resolution of the puzzle lies in the difficulty of interpreting
stock price reactions to corporate decisions. A stock price change
might reflect some other event simultaneous to the decision or simply
noise. In the Heinz case, the current stock price may reflect some
probabilistic assessment of whetherJohnson or Peltz will prevail multi-
plied by the expected benefit from their respective plans, but share-
holders deciding how to vote or whether to sell may be unable to
unpack the relevant numbers. Advisors of various kinds, like analysts,
shareholder advisors, and proxy firms, may offer advice, but these
views may be tainted by self-interest or other extrinsic considerations,
and will be noisy as well. Stock prices also can be misleading because
under current insider trading law, a firm's stock price does not fully
reflect all available information about the firm, thereby undermining
its value as a governance mechanism. 3
2 While stock market predictions in general play an important role in motivating
corporate actors, this is as a result of individual acceptance of the general validity of
the stock price metric, not as a result of any systematic scheme. When the stock price
is falling, directors will be more willing to fire the CEO, and shareholders will be more
willing to seek out new directors. See Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top
Management Changes, 20J. FIN. ECON. 461, 487 (1988) (finding increased CEO turno-
ver for firms in financial distress). But no rule mandates personnel changes in
response to market assessments, and corporations do not even adopt decisionmaking
procedures that give presumptive weight to market assessments.
3 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 869-72 (1983).
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If stock market predictions were more easily interpreted and
more fully informed, corporations might place more weight on them
in their decisionmaking, and corporate law might nudge corporate
decisionmakers to give such predictions increased weight. A new
technology, known as "prediction markets" or "information markets,"4
makes this possibility less hypothetical. Prediction markets are mar-
kets in which various contracts with payoffs tied to uncertain future
events are traded. For example, the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM),
run by the University of Iowa Tippie School of Business, includes pre-
diction markets for elections, economic indicators, and other future
uncertainties. 5 Prediction markets have been shown to forecast better
than, or at least as well as, public opinion polls,6 public experts, 7 and
private experts.8 Rather than revisit the prediction market literature,
we assume for the purpose of this Article that prediction markets are
generally an accurate predictive tool. We ask how corporations can
improve governance with prediction markets.
We argue that these markets, whether voluntarily deployed by
firms or, more ambitiously, required by law, can solve many net-
tlesome corporate law issues. Our thesis is that corporate prediction
markets have the potential to reduce information costs (by reducing
asymmetries between a firm and its investors without disclosing corpo-
rate secrets), agency costs (by making shareholder monitoring easier),
and the transaction costs of decisionmaking (by making corporate
4 For a dynamically updated bibliography of prediction market research, see
Papers on Event Derivatives (Event Futures), Prediction Markets and Prediction
Exchanges (Betting Exchanges), http://www.chrisfmasse.com/3/3/papers (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Papers].
5 See Univ. of Iowa, Henry B. Tippie Coll, of Bus., Iowa Electronic Markets,
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). For a discussion of how
the IEM and like markets might inspire a revolution in management, see Barbara
Kiviat, The End of Management?, TiME, July 12, 2004, at 4.
6 SeeJoyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Mar-
kets 33 (July 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/archive/forecasting.pdf (reporting that the IEM gave results closer to actual elec-
tion results than election polls did in 451 of 596 polls).
7 See, e~g., Refet Gfirkaynak &Justin Wolfers, Macroeconomic Derivatives: An Initial
Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty and Risk 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11,929, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/wi1929 (finding that prediction markets slightly outperform surveys of
experts in estimating economic statistics).
8 See, e.g., Kay-Yut Chen & Charles R. Plott, Information Aggregation Mechanisms:
Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem 13 (Cal. Inst. Tech.,
Social Sciences Working Paper No. 1131, 2002), available at http://www.hpl.hp.com/
personal/Kay-YutChen/paper/ms020408.pdf. Other business experiments with pre-
diction markets are described infra Part I.A.
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and insurgent decisions more informed, cheaper to make, and easier
to understand). As a purely business matter, these markets may allow
firms to extract and process information from all parts of the organi-
zation, encouraging anonymous whistleblowing and reducing the
potential for fraud and waste. Prediction markets also can help
ensure that corporations act in the interests of shareholders or other
constituencies.
In the battle for control of Heinz, markets might estimate the
value of the Johnson plan versus the Peltz plan. The mere existence
of these markets, whether required by law or voluntarily created by
managers or raiders, might have eliminated the conflict by providing
a reliable assessment to different corporate players. Johnson and
other managers may still have self-interested motivations (as, perhaps,
may Peltz), but markets could help discipline their actions by expos-
ing decisions expected to lower stock price. If the conflict nonethe-
less ended up in litigation, courts might consider evidence from the
prediction markets to assess the controversy, rather than focusing
solely on procedural issues.
These markets are still in early stages, and the initial challenge,
not explored here, is to ensure that the law does not stymie voluntary
experimentation. 9 In the long term, however, legal institutions might
encourage or even mandate prediction markets. Courts could, for
example, require firms to use prediction markets to analyze the
impact of certain fundamental business transactions as a precondition
of receiving the lenient treatment of the business judgment rule.10
Regulators could require firms to use these markets to inform the
market about financial and operational details, perhaps as an alterna-
tive or complement to other approaches to disclosure. Mandatory
prediction markets on subjects like earnings results would be more
reliable, less costly to implement, and more difficult to manipulate
than the internal controls systems required under current law. We
explore these and other potential applications in more detail below.
Corporate decisionmaking and governance should be an attrac-
tive application for prediction markets relative to other areas of law,
both because corporations have already begun employing simple ver-
sions of prediction markets, and because stock markets already have a
significant informal role in corporate decisionmaking. The legal liter-
ature on prediction markets, however, has ignored the possible use of
9 See infra note 94.
10 See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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these markets as tools of corporate law."
1 Thomas Malone, a business
school professor, has argued that businesses increasingly 
are decen-
tralizing decisionmaking and notes that prediction 
markets may serve
as one of many tools in this process, but he does 
not explore the appli-
cations discussed here.
1 2
Early corporate experimentation with prediction 
markets is
encouraging, but it has been limited in several 
ways. 13 First, corpora-
tions have created prediction markets to serve 
as inputs into other
corporate decisions, rather than to assess corporate 
decisions directly.
"Conditional markets" assessing the impact of 
decisions on variables
such as stock price will be the focus of our discussion.
1 4 Second, cor-
porations have used prediction markets so far 
solely to move informa-
tion to decisionmakers within the corporation. 
We will emphasize the
possibility of corporations releasing predictions, 
bringing to all inves-
tors the value of inside information while avoiding 
an unequal playing
field. Third, existing experiments with prediction 
markets have been
conducted by the firms themselves. We anticipate 
that as prediction
markets gain respect and credibility, they could 
become weapons in
corporate politics, for example created 
by large individual
shareholders.
In Part I, we sketch the basics of prediction markets 
with a focus
on their use in the corporate context. We also 
briefly address con-
cerns raised about the efficacy of these markets, including 
liquidity,
accuracy, and manipulability. Part II describes 
difficulties in corpo-
rate information flow and explains how prediction 
markets can help.
It compares prediction market solutions with alternative 
approaches,
including mandating internal controls, relaxing insider 
trading rules,
and enhancing insider trading regulation. Information 
flow itself
should reduce agency costs, but Part III considers 
how specific appli-
cations of prediction markets could improve corporate 
governance. It
explains how prediction markets could be used 
to assess corporate
11 The articles that come closest to our 
analysis are Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient
Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets and the
Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CoRP. L. 589, 594 
(2003) and Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That 
Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167,
183-85 (2005). Both, however, suggest that prediction 
markets might have lessons
for legal regulation, not that prediction markets 
might be used as tools of legal regu-
lation. For some other citations to the legal 
literature on prediction markets, see infra
notes 41 and 62.
12 THOMAS W. MALONE, THE FUTURE 
OF WORK 31-37, 73-126 (2004).
13 See infra Part I.A.
14 See, e.g., Robin D. Hanson, Decision Markets, 
IEEE INTELLIcENT Svs., May-June
1999, at 16, 16 (discussing conditional markets and 
briefly considering corporate
applications).
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strategy and personnel decisions, and how prediction markets might
be used to assess the interests of constituencies other than sharehold-
ers. We cover many possible proposals here, recognizing that each
could be developed and scrutinized in far greater detail, because our
purpose is to provide an overview of the use of prediction markets
rather than specific policy recommendations. We close by offering
some preliminary conclusions, identifying some open questions, and
identifying possible avenues for future research.
I. A PRIMER ON CORPORATE PREDICTION MARKETS
The traditional design structure for a prediction market is simple:
A market sponsor introduces one or more tradable contracts that pro-
vide for payment contingent on some future event. Each contract
either pays off a fixed amount if the event resolves in a particular way
(for example, if a particular candidate wins an election), or it pays off
an amount that varies depending on some number that can be deter-
mined in the future (for example, one penny per percent of the vote
that one candidate receives). The prices at which trades occur pro-
vide at least an approximate market-based prediction of the event.15
A. Early Corporate Innovators
Kay-Yut Chen, an employee of Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, and
Charles Plott, an experimental economist, conducted the earliest
apparent study of the prospect of using these markets to improve cor-
porate decisionmaking. 16 They hoped that prediction markets would
provide a means of aggregating "small bits and pieces of relevant
information [that] exists in the opinions and intuition of individuals
who are close to an activity,"'1 7 and thus of measuring what James
Surowiecki has called "the wisdom of crowds."18 Participants were
given real money that they could use in the game. Each market pre-
dicted the future monthly sales of various products. Meanwhile, Hew-
lett-Packard continued to assign some employees to produce forecasts.
Chen and Plott concluded that the consensus market predictions were
a "considerable improvement" over official forecasts-beating official
forecasts fifteen out of sixteen times in one experiment and six out of
15 For an argument that prediction market prices can be interpreted as probabili-
ties, see Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabili-
ties (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2092, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract921642.
16 See Chen & Plott, supra note 8, at 112-17.
17 See id. at 3.
18 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv (2004).
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ten in another-and that this result was robust to different possibility
specifications of the method of calculating the probability forecast.19
One should be cautious before drawing broad conclusions from a
single study. Perhaps Hewlett-Packard's official forecasters were
unusually bad, in which case the market's beating them was no big
feat. Hewlett-Packard's initial success with using prediction markets
to improve internal estimations, however, has been replicated at a
variety of other firms in numerous industries. For example, drug
maker Eli Lilly established an internal prediction market to estimate
drug development success. 20 It allowed about fifty employees from a
range of corporate areas to trade on six drug candidates; the market
aggregated toxicology data, clinical trial results, and marketing data
better than any existing mechanism, correctly forecasting the three
most successful drugs.21 Similar successes have been observed at Intel,
which ran an experiment in which a prediction market outperformed
existing mechanisms for allocation of manufacturing capacity;22 at Sie-
mens to predict a project completion date more reliably than official
forecasts;23 at GE to generate new business ideas; 24 and at France
Telecom.2 5
B. Designs for Future Corporate Experimentation
Firms have used a variety of different market and contract types
in current experiments with this technology, only some of which may
be useful in governance and other corporate law issues we investigate
in this Article. We are particularly, though not exclusively, interested
in subsidized, conditional prediction markets that forecast stock price
contingent on different decisions that the firm might make. We will
briefly catalog some of the key features of these markets. Our imme-
diate goal, however, is not to offer full descriptions of the relevant
mechanisms, let alone full evaluations of any associated technical
19 See Chen & Plott, supra note 8, at 12-13.
20 See James M. Pethokoukis, All Seeing All Knowing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 54. For a list of firms served by one leading provider of prediction
market technology and advice, see News Futures, http://us.newsfutures.com (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2007).
21 See Pethokoukis, supra note 20, at 54.
22 See Kiviat, supra note 5.
23 See Alexander Tabarrok, In Defense of Prediction Markets, RED HERRING, Sept. 23,
2003, http://hanson.gmu.edu/PAM/press/redherring-9-23-03.htm.
24 See Michael Totty, How to Decide? Create a Market, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2006, at
R9.
25 See Project Destiny, http://qadh.pair.com/-ftrd/destiny/other.cgi (last visited
Mar. 25, 2007).
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problems, issues that the literature is already actively 
considering. 26
Rather, we merely intend to describe the mechanisms 
that we envi-
sion, to offer a brief explanation of their technical 
feasibility and to
explain their relevance to corporate decisionmaking 
and corporate
law.
1. Subsidized Markets with Automated Market 
Makers
We anticipate that prediction markets would be 
subsidized at sig-
nificant levels for corporate prediction markets, 
with the subsidy levels
proportional to the importance of the decision. 
In the absence of a
subsidy, prediction markets are a zero-sum game, 
and someone will
generally participate only if the person derives 
utility from participa-
tion alone or if the person expects to win money 
from others who
have entered the market. While this may be sufficient 
incentive for
some firms or for some markets, it is unlikely 
that the kind of wide-
spread use of markets we describe here would arise 
without substantial
subsidies.
These subsidies can be in the form of cash, in-kind 
payments, or
other forms. For extraordinary corporate decisions, 
like whether to
pursue a merger or who should be the CEO, a single 
prediction mar-
ket might be given millions of dollars in subsidies. 
At this subsidy
level, individuals will have incentives not only to 
participate, but also
to seek out relevant information and to develop 
sophisticated models
of whatever is being predicted. While a subsidy 
of several million dol-
lars for a particular market may sound costly, it is 
comparable (or less)
than firms currently spend internally and on fees 
for professional ser-
vices (e.g., lawyers, compensation consultants, proxy solicitation 
firms,
bankers, etc.) in such cases.
26 See, e.g., David M. Pennock, A Dynamic Pari-Mutuel 
Market for Hedging Wagering,
and Information Aggregation, in EC '04: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH 
ACM CONFERENCE ON
ELECtRONIC COMMERCE 170, 171-78 (2004); Emile Servan-Schreiber 
et al., Prediction
Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC 
MARKETS 243, 246-49, available at http://
bpp'wharton'upenn'edu/jwolfers/Papers/DoesMoneyMatter'pdf; 
Justin Wolfers &
Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Marekts in Theory and Practice, 
in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Lawrence Blum & Steven Durlauf eds., 
2d ed.) (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-88
4 483; Paul Tedock & Robert Hahn, Optimal
Liquidity Provision for Decision Makers (AEI-BrookingsJoint 
Center for Regulatory Stud-
ies, Working Paper No. 06-18, 2007); Justin Wolfers & 
Eric Zitzewitz, Five Open Ques-
tions About Prediction Markets (Inst. for the Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 1975,
2006) [hereinafter Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions], 
available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=88
4 4 83; John Ledyard et al., An Experimental Test 
of Combinatorial Infor-
mation Markets (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://hanson.
gmu.edu/testcomb.pdf.
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Even with subsidies, the number of participants in any given pre-
diction market might be relatively low, resulting in low liquidity and
therefore lower reliability. Most prediction markets use a continuous
double auction method that matches willing buyers and sellers in a
way that poses no risk for the exchange. If some participants are
expected to have excellent information, however, others will be hesi-
tant to trade with them. Fortunately, recent market designs can, in
effect, provide infinite liquidity. We will summarize one such
approach here,2 7 the "market scoring rules" devised by Robin Han-
son.28 This approach builds on the concept of a scoring rule, a func-
tion that is used to reward a single individual for making a
probabilistic prediction, with more accurate predictions receiving
higher rewards. 29
Under the market scoring rule, any individual can make the first
prediction as to a particular outcome, and then anyone can displace
the previous predictor by committing to pay off the previous predictor
according to the scoring rule, and then announcing a new prediction.
The most recent prediction becomes the consensus prediction of the
market. In laboratory experiments, the market scoring rule out-
performs more traditional market mechanisms at predicting out-
comes in low-liquidity environments, especially in cases where
information asymmetry is a problem.30
From a user interface perspective, the market scoring rule can
appear to be no different from traditional markets. A user can buy or
sell any number of contracts, with the price of the contracts changing
with each incremental purchase. This approach ensures that traders
will be able to cover any losses and that traders will lose no more than
they have invested. In effect, these designs provide for an automated
27 An alternative approach, developed and patented by Yahoo!, is a dynamic pari-
mutuel market, a variation on traditional pari-mutuel markets, like those used in
horse race betting. See Pennock, supra note 26, at 174.
28 See Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 INFO. SYs. FRON-
TIERS 107, 109-13 (2003).
29 See, e.g., Morris H. DeGroot & Stephen E. Fienberg, The Comparison and Evalua-
tion of Forecasters, 32 STATISTIC AN 12, 20 (1983) (discussing scoring rules and their
limitations).
30 Ledyard et al., supra note 26, at 12 ("The market scoring rule had the best
performance overall, clearly beating all other mechanisms in one environment, and
doing as well as any other mechanism in the other environment."). A practical design
advantage of the market scoring rule is that it provides a relatively simple approach
for creating a subsidy. The maximum subsidy is simply the largest amount that some-
one might receive under the relevant scoring rule. In effect, the market sponsor
needs to worry only about paying the last predictor, though in practice, the market
sponsor will serve as a bank to clear all transactions.
[VOL. 82:41352
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market maker, with the system offering to buy 
or sell contracts at
prices that depend on the current predictions. Even 
if there turns out
to be only one trader in these markets, the 
mere possibility that
another trader will come along, along with the 
eventual resolution of
the scoring rule in the market scoring rule approach, 
will provide that
trader with an incentive to make honest predictions.
2. Conditional Markets
Corporate prediction markets are likely to be 
of significant value
only if they can predict future outcomes of 
a variety of potential
courses of action, which means estimating the 
impact of events that
might not ever happen. Assessing the impact 
of a potential corporate
strategy that might not be implemented is tricky, 
especially if the mar-
ket recommends against implementing the strategy. 
A prediction
market designed to forecast the impact on Heinz's 
stock price if the
firm adopts the Peltz plan must address two problems: 
(1) How are
contracts resolved in case Heinz does not adopt 
the Peltz plan?; and
(2) How can the markets avoid circularity, estimating 
not just the
absolute impact of the plan, but also the probability 
that the plan
would be adopted, which in turn depends on 
the prediction of the
market itself?
The literature has developed various approaches 
to implement-
ing "conditional markets,"
3
' which allow the prediction of one varia-
ble contingent on the occurrence of a particuar 
event. For our
limited purpose of establishing the practical 
feasibility of such mar-
kets, it is sufficient to describe one means 
of implementing them.
3 2
The market sponsor can provide that all market 
transactions will be
"unwound" if the event does not occur, so all market participants
receive back any money that they invested over 
time, perhaps with
interest.33 This approach is already used and 
widely accepted in bet-
ting markets, such as those hosted by Tradesports.com: 
A tradable
contract on how many votes a particular judicial nominee will 
receive
in the Senate carries an implicit condition that 
the candidate actually
receives a vote. 34 This approach also addresses 
the circularity issue.
31 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 14, at 17; Wolfers & 
Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions,
supra note 26, at 19-20.
32 Hanson describes an alternative approach, 
using the market scoring rule to
create many combinatorial markets. See Hanson, 
supra note 28, at 110-16.
33 Many existing markets, like those 
hosted on Tradesports.com, use a similar
approach to unwind implicitly conditional markets 
like "How many votes will Harriet
Miers receive in the Senate?"
34 When Harriet Miers withdrew her nomination 
from consideration,
Tradesports.com unwound the bets on how many 
votes she would receive.
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An optimistic prediction market forecast may make a particular deci-
sion more likely, but it should not generally have a marked effect on
the conditional predictions.3 5
C. Obstacles to Market Accuracy
In discussing prediction market design, we have already
responded to one significant potential criticism: that prediction mar-
kets might have too little liquidity to make meaningful assessments.
This subpart discusses several other obstacles to prediction market
accuracy. We recognize that these obstacles might well delay deploy-
ment of prediction markets and might reduce their effectiveness.
Nonetheless, in the corporate context, there are particular reasons to
believe that these problems can be overcome.
1. Inefficient Markets
A significant general objection is that markets can be inefficient,
and in particular that they may be prone to speculative bubbles.
Whatever the merits of this controversy, stock markets appear none-
theless to be superior to alternative approaches to distributing capital,
such as assigning government officials or panels of experts to judging
the future effectiveness of various companies. Likewise, while there is
some recent evidence that suggests that some individuals do occasion-
ally "beat the market," past performance is not a reliable indication of
future results. 36 And so, it would be difficult to designate specific indi-
vidual corporate forecasters and have confidence that they will be the
ones who will beat the market. The better approach is to allow these
forecasters to bet in the market, and thus to influence prices, even if
35 A caveat is that if predictions become self-fulfilling prophecies, the evaluation
of rejected alternatives may be unreliable. See infra Part I.C.3 (addressing this issue).
A separate caveat is that nonconditional markets can become self-defeating prophe-
cies. For example, if a market to predict an earnings restatement is run after the
initial statement of earnings, then an indication of a problem ultimately may lead to
the correction of the problem, preventing the person trading on the information
from profiting. Design alterations, such as markets predicting final earnings num-
bers, can avoid this problem. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing related markets).
36 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 23 (8th ed.
2003) (explaining the theory that securities prices exhibit a "random walk" unaffected
by past price trends); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191, 193-96 (1988) (demonstrating the difficulty of obtaining assets for less
than their true value); Anna Bernasek & Burton Malkiel, The Man Your Fund Manager
Hates, FORTUNE, Dec. 20, 1999, at 134; Burton G. Malkiel, Indexes: Why the Critics Are
Wrong, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1999, at A30.
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such arbitrage will only imperfectly offset problems 
that may lead to
occasional mispricing.
Moreover, inefficiencies of equity markets will not 
necessarily be
problems in prediction markets. Equity markets 
are subject to bub-
bles in part because of the possibility of earning 
fortunes from passive
investments; prediction markets, on the other hand, 
have no inherent
upward trend. Participants will recognize that 
they cannot simply
throw money into the market, but that they must 
make predictions on
specific markets. Occasional bubbles might 
form, for example
because market participants misinterpret some 
trades as reflecting
information. Such bubbles have occurred in 
laboratory experiments,
though only rarely.
3 7 Derivatively informed trading in any event 
can
be a rational market strategy that in general 
increases market effi-
ciency, even if there are occasions in which the 
strategy leads the mar-
ket astray.
2. Manipulation
An objection to reliance on prediction markets for decisionmak-
ing is that individuals with an interest in the 
decisions might seek to
manipulate the prediction markets. Someone 
who seeks to push a
market in a direction not justified by valuable information, however,
increases the incentive for others to enter the market 
and push it back
in the other direction. Indeed, a laboratory 
experiment that gave
some prediction market participants incentives 
to manipulate found
that such incentives in general improved market 
accuracy, because the
attempts at manipulation increased the liquidity 
of the market and
the potential profits from trading.
38 A separate experiment in which
the author sought to manipulate the IEM 
in randomly determined
ways indicates that attempts at manipulation have 
only small and tem-
porary effects on market prices.
39
37 See Colin Camerer & Keith Wiegelt, 
Information Mirages in Experimental Asset
Markets, 64J. Bus. 463, 490 (1991); David P. Porter 
& Vernon L. Smith, Stock Market
Bubbles in the Laboratory, 1 APPLIED MATHEMATICAL 
FIN. 111, 114-21 (1994); Lucy F.
Ackert et al., The Origins of Bubbles in Laboratory Asset 
Markets 14-15 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2006-6, 
2006), available at http://ssrm.com/
abstract=903159.
38 See Robin Hanson et al., Information Aggregation 
and Manipulation in an Experi-
mental Market, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 449 (2006).
39 Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, 
Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A
Field Experiment and a Century of Observational 
Data 31 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.unc.edu/-cig
a r / p a p e r s / M a n ip - a p e r - 2 0 0 5 -
1 7
(KS).pdf.
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It remains possible that manipulation might add 
some noise to
prediction markets, because nonmanipulating 
participants may
slightly underestimate or overestimate the degree 
to which others are
manipulating. But at least manipulation should 
not add any system-
atic bias, and the prospect of manipulation should 
increase liquidity
and thus reduce noise overall. Corporations 
are in any event in a
good position to reduce the danger of manipulation 
in prediction
markets that they control. For example, in 
an internal prediction
market involving only employees of the corporation, 
corporate offi-
cials might explicitly or implicitly threaten to 
punish anyone found to
have attempted to manipulated the market.
3. Unlikely Conditions
We have already shown how subsidies and automated 
market
makers address the liquidity concern in markets 
generally. But what if
the probability of the conditional event occurring 
is low? Corpora-
tions might want to assess the stock price impact 
of decisions that are
unlikely to occur. Would anyone trade in a market 
in which, say,
there was a ninety percent chance that 
the market would be
unwound? With sufficient subsidy, the answer 
is probably yes, but the
risk inherent in such trading would increase the 
amount of subsidies
necessary.
In any event, there are several possible solutions 
to this problem.
We will consider one for low probability events 
and one for very low
probability events. For low probability events, 
the market could be
structured as a two-stage conditional market, with 
the first market pre-
dicting the outcome of the second market. Let 
us assume that the
firm setting up the market wants to make a 
decision on June 1 on
whether it should spin off one of its business 
units, but the market
thinks that there is a low probability (say, a ten percent 
chance) that
the firm would actually take this action. The 
firm would establish a
basic prediction market (call it B) starting, say, one week 
before the
decision is to be made, that would predict the 
impact of the spin-off
on the stock price. Market B would be a low-subsidy 
market in which
few individuals would be expected to participate 
and little trading
would occur because of the low probability 
of the event coming to
pass. The value of this market would therefore 
not be in aggregating
or processing information, since traders would 
have little incentive to
research, but in providing a reference point 
for another, earlier
market.
This earlier market (call it Market A) would be established, say,
six months before the decision date, would be 
heavily subsidized, and
[VOL. 82:4
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would predict the outcome of Market B. Traders in Market A would
thus be trading based on what they think traders in Market B will pre-
dict about the eventual decision (which will be made after Market B).
As one of the authors has shown in prior work, it is irrelevant that
Market B would involve trivial trading and little information generat-
ing activity. 40 It is sufficient to generate trading volume in Market A
that Market B will make a prediction, or more precisely, that there is a
chance that Market B will make a prediction. If the price in Market A
failed to reflect market fundamentals, then someone in Market B
would have an incentive to trade on Market B. (This assumes that the
market design allows a single person to trade against an automated
market maker.) It is possible, of course, that no one will trade on
Market B, since someone with information would have already traded
on it in Market A. If no trades occur in Market B, then Market A is
resolved based on its own final trading price. Even in this case, Mar-
ket A's predictions are disciplined by the possibility of trading in Mar-
ket B, and there is no need to unwind transactions for low probability
events.
For very low probability events (perhaps less than a one percent
chance, as determined by a separate nonconditional market), a "nor-
mative market," that is a market that aggregats opinions, might be
useful. 4' Instead of relying on Market B to discipline Market A, the
firm could simply designate a particular individual (or set of individu-
als) to make a decision during the period when Market B would oth-
erwise be operating. For example, before starting Market A, the firm
could state that the firm will ask a randomly selected shareholder to
evaluate the decision (or, perhaps, to select among various consulting
firms that offer to conduct more thorough analyses). Market A would
then be established to predict the estimate of the shareholder or the
consulting firm. Because the random selection would be made only
after Market A closed, the market would predict the average view of
all eligible analysts.
4. Unavailable Information
Another problem may arise because of informational asymme-
tries between the decisionmaker and any market participant. For
example, a corporate decisionmaker, such as a CEO, might have infor-
mation and experience unavailable to most market participants, and
40 Michael Abramowicz, Deliberative Information Markets for Small Groups, in INFOR-
MATION MARKETS 101, 115-17 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Teflock eds. 2006).
41 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 938-39 (2004).
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one might think that a prediction market would not 
be as effective as
that individual decisionmaker. Even in cases where 
an individual has
superior information, prediction markets can be 
useful. The superior
information objection implies that a prediction market should 
not be
used to discipline or constrain the decisionmaker. 
But the question is
not whether a prediction market will perform 
as well as a corporate
decisionmaker would in isolation, but whether 
a prediction market
can improve on the initial recommendations 
of a corporate deci-
sionmaker. The literature suggests that supplementary 
contributions
to, and checks on, informed decisionmakers 
improve overall decision
quality.42
Lucian Bebchuk has made a similar point about 
shareholder vot-
ing.43 Insiders may sometimes have information 
unavailable to share-
holder voters, but a corporation can give an 
official recommendation
on how to vote to those shareholder voters. 
There is no reason to
believe, Bebchuk thinks, that shareholders will 
place too little weight
on the official recommendations
44 This is even more strongly true in
the context of prediction markets. If some participants 
in prediction
markets place too little weight on the official 
corporate recommenda-
tion, others will have a profit incentive to take 
contrary positions. In
cases in which a prediction market suggests that 
a corporate position
is misguided, the consensus estimate is that the 
deference that should
be given to the corporate decisionmaker on account 
of good informa-
tion is not sufficient to overcome the intrinsic 
case against the deci-
sion, There is no theoretical reason to believe 
that such a market
consensus is more likely wrong than right.
Even where a corporation does not announce 
an official recom-
mendation, prediction markets may provide useful 
and easily digesti-
ble information to the CEO or other decisionmaker. 
Consider a
prediction market estimating the firm's stock 
price following the
adoption of the proposed strategy. The CEO or 
the board may think
that it has superior information to potential participants 
in this mar-
ket for a variety of reasons, ranging from experience 
and data to ego.
Even so, there is no reason to exclude the sources 
of information
reflected in the market. The market might signal 
an issue that man-
agement is unaware of, or it may corroborate 
management's view.
Firms routinely spend large sums on consulting 
firms to corroborate
42 Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making 
in Business Organizations, 69 AM.
EcoN. REv. 493, 503 (1979).
43 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973, 977-78 (2002).
44 Id. at 978.
2007] PREDICTION MARKETS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
the conclusions already reached by management, and the costs of
establishing a prediction market will likely be far less. At the least, the
market may inform the CEO about wider perceptions of the strategy,
a valuable piece of information that a CEO might not be able to relia-
bly obtain from other sources.
The possibility that corporate decisionmakers might have infor-
mation unavailable to market participants does, however, present a
potential technical complication in interpreting conditional mar-
ket. 45 A market prediction can confound an evaluation of the effects
of a particular decision on the probability of an event with an analysis
of what the fact that the decision was made indicates about the
probability of the event. In the corporate context, suppose, for exam-
ple, that a prediction market is used to predict corporate stock price
conditional on a decision by the corporation to sell a major asset.
Suppose, further, that market participants believe that there is some
probability that the corporate decisionmakers have information indi-
cating that the firm is in worse financial shape than the market
believes, and that if this is the case, the firm would need to sell the
asset. Then, even if it is unequivocally a good decision to sell the asset
regardless of financial circumstances, market participants would rec-
ognize that if the firm does sell the asset, that could be an ominous
sign of the firm's financial health. Therefore, the market might pre-
dict that the stock price conditional on the sale will be lower than the
current stock price.
Despite this example, we doubt that this problem is serious in the
corporate context, because conditional market predictions are suspect
only in a case in which the corporation's decision affects the market's
perception of the initial state of the firm. These cases will be rare for
publicly traded corporations that are widely covered by analysts, rating
agencies, the media, and large shareholders; publicly released predic-
tion markets in which insiders can trade, as described in Part II, can
make these cases rarer still. Sometimes, a decisionmaker may be
expected simply to have better information than the market about the
effects of a decision. In this case, the market prediction might exag-
gerate the market's perception of the benefits of a particular
approach. But as long as separate markets predict the consequences
of taking different paths, including doing one thing and not another,
the market should still recommend the path that it thinks is best.
45 For further discussion of this problem in conditional markets, see Abramowicz,
supra note 41, at 938-39.
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5. Minor Decisions
So far, we have considered decisions that will have a significant
effect on stock price. If the effect of a decision on stock price is rela-
tively small, then conditional markets might not be able to tease it
out.4 6 To take an extreme example, suppose that a corporation
wishes to decide whether to mow the grass outside corporate head-
quarters once or twice a week. As a theoretical matter, this might have
some effect on shareholders: mow too often, and the corporation is
wasting money; mow too little, and the corporation's image might suf-
fer. The effect, however, is so small that it is likely to be swamped by
noise. If, for example, a market prediction is derived from comparing
the last price of transactions on two conditional markets correspond-
ing to the two possible decisions, then it might be happenstance
whether someone happens to make a purchase from one conditional
market or another.
There are, however, possible solutions that would enable predic-
tion markets to assess relatively minor decisions. First, conditional
markets might be calibrated to predict not stock price at some point
in the distant future, but instead stock price reaction to the announce-
ment of a particular decision. Although other simultaneous news or
announcements may also affect stock prices, these cannot be antici-
pated, and so the market prediction of the expected stock price
change should be reliable even if the ex post measure is noisy. This
approach should work as long as there remains some uncertainty
about what the decision will be just before the announcement.
Second, a conditional market could predict something other
than the stock price of the corporation. One possibility is to use a
normative prediction market in which what is predicted is a subjective
assessment of a particular decision. Ideally, the subjective assessment
that disciplines the market should occur some time, perhaps several
years, after the decision is or is not instituted. Delay can limit the
danger that a normative market will merely impound the conven-
tional wisdom.
II. IMPROVING CORPORATE INFORMATION FLOW
Much of corporate law seeks to design structures or processes to
move information efficiently within a firm and from a firm to the mar-
ket. In this way, corporate governance can be seen as the process of
allocating power in ways that tend to minimize the sum of various
costs, such as information costs, transactions costs, and agency costs.
46 Id. at 1009.
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We argue that prediction markets may help lower the 
sum of transac-
tion, information, and agency costs. For example, 
better information
can allow shareholders to monitor managerial 
and board decision-
making more easily; these markets may also be 
less expensive than
alternative means of facilitating information flows 
to equity markets.
In particular, we will argue that prediction markets 
have advantages
over several alternative approaches to improving 
information flow,
including institution of internal controls, abolition 
of insider trading
rules, and enhancement of disclosure regulation.
A. Flow of Information to the CEO and the Board
In Enron, WorldCom, and many of the other recent 
corporate
scandals, certain individuals or groups were 
able to hide valuable
information from managers, the board, and others 
responsible for
either making or monitoring decisions. This 
was possible because
decisions within most firms are made only after 
information has been
processed at numerous levels of firm hierarchy, 
each one of which
adds not only the real costs of people, time, and 
resources, but also
error costs and the potential for opportunism by 
those who might put
personal profit ahead of firm welfare. The law's 
response has been
largely structural and organizational-for example, 
mandatory inter-
nal control systems, penalties and other incentives 
for increasing mon-
itoring by directors, and increased legal 
protections for
whistleblowers. 47 There already exists, however, a 
potential market-
based mechanism for efficiently conveying information 
through an
organization to decisionmakers-the stock price. We 
will look briefly
at the benefits of this approach, and then offer a 
better alternative.
1. The Virtues and Limitations of Following Stock 
Prices
One of the great virtues of a publicly traded corporation 
is that
the overall health of the corporation can be assessed 
through a simple
arithmetic operation, by calculating its market capitalization, 
that is,
the stock price multiplied by the number of shares. 
Stock price
accordingly is a central focus of firm behavior. 
CEOs may be fired
when the stock price slips relative to competitors, and 
CEO contracts
47 For a discussion of the basic reforms of the Act, 
see Douglas M. Branson, Too
Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate Governance 
in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era,
58 S.C. L. REv 65 (2006). For an analysis of the procedural and 
political history of the
Act, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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are designed to provide incentives to take actions that will increase
investor confidence. 4 8
While there are risks of this focus on stock price, particularly
when CEOs have incentives to present incomplete information to the
market to ensure short-run increases in stock price, the discipline pro-
vided by stock prices advances the interests of shareholders, because
the stock price proxy for corporate health reduces information costs.
Even those who will scrutinize a corporation's health by a careful
examination of a wide range of sources will often start with stock price
as a reference point. They will then seek to find hidden sources of
value that the market has not yet recognized (making the corporation
undervalued), or hidden perils that the market has not yet appreci-
ated (making the corporation overvalued).
The improved information that the stock price provides also
reduces a corporation's agency costs. Agency costs have been defined
as the sum of the monitoring expenditures that a principal incurs to
supervise the agent, the bonding expenditures that an agency incurs
to show faithfulness to the principal, and the residual loss from the
nonalignment of the incentives of the principal and the agent.49
Because the stock price mechanism provides a means of monitoring
the management of the corporation as a whole, it reduces the need
for shareholders to spend money on alternative means of assessing the
performances of management and on procedures (such as share-
holder votes) that might discipline management decisionmaking.
Meanwhile, high-level managers can bond themselves by agreeing to
accept some compensation in the form of stock options rather than
cash. Because the stock price improves monitoring and bonding, it at
least has the potential to reduce the residual loss from agency costs.
But stock prices have several significant disadvantages, especially
when it comes to using them to make internal firm decisions, like
whether to follow a particular strategy or who should sit on the
board.50 First, the stock price is too blunt, representing the per share
48 See StewartJ. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employ-
ment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 231,
263-64 (2006) (showing that CEO contracts routinely included performance-based
bonus and equity-based incentives to align shareholder and management interests).
49 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976).
50 Another potential objection to reliance on market prices is that maximization
of shareholder wealth might not be the only goal of a firm. Some nonprofit firms,
after all, might be seen as maximizing other variables, and even public corporations
might care about constituencies besides their shareholders. See generally Einer
Elbauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 776-818
(2005) (arguing that the law does and should give managers discretion not to maxi-
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value of the expected cash flows for all future periods discounted back
to the present, rather than a narrowly tailored market view on a partic-
ular issue. Any number of firm-specific or market-wide developments
can thus be expected to affect the stock price in ways that may be
difficult to unpack from the particular relevant event being analyzed.
The bluntness of the stock price also may discourage trading. An
investor may have information about one thing (say, a positive view
about one project), but offsetting information about something else
(say, a negative view about another project). The firm and market will
not benefit from information disclosure, even if the basis for trading
could be decoded.
Second, the stock price does not reflect all available information,
since those with the very best information about the firm are legally
prohibited from trading on the basis of that information. Insiders
with information about the success or failure of corporate projects,
public auditors with opinions about the veracity and completeness of
firm financial statements, and outside counsel with views on the firm's
compliance with the law, are all forbidden from transmitting their
information to the market. In addition, an insider with material, non-
public information about one aspect of the firm's business will be
deterred from trading even if in possession of valuable information
about another aspect of the firm's business, if such trading could give
rise to trading liability. These realities seriously undercut the utility of
the stock price as a decision input (or determinant) for corporate
decisionmakers.
Third, in a world of reasonably effective insider trading laws, mar-
kets respond only to the public release of information about the firm.
Thus, a firm deciding between one of two projects will only get the
market's view on its choice once it has made the decision. This is
valuable for some purposes, like disciplining managers, but is much
less valuable for evaluating the merits of the two projects, because
decisions announced and then unmade carry significant costs both in
terms of actual expenditures and losses in reputation.
Fourth, stock prices also may suffer from upwards bias due to the
limitations on short sales found in various federal laws and regula-
tions. 51 If the stock price represents the average of the bets made by
mize shareholder wealth). We do not claim that stock price should be the sole rele-
vant criterion in assessing a corporation's decisions. It is ordinarily a very important
criterion, and at least it should be useful to assess corporate decisions and manage-
ment against this metric. Prediction markets also might be used to assess how deci-
sions will affect other constituencies. See infra Part III.C.
51 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32J. FIN. 1151,
1160 (1977).
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those who think the stock will rise and those who think it will fall, but
those who think it will fall are disadvantaged in the number and type
of bets they can make compared with those who think it will rise, then,
all else being equal, the stock price may be upwardly biased in the
short run. As David Schizer explains: "If pessimists cannot trade, opti-
mists are likely to have a disproportionate influence on prices."52 This
phenomenon reduces the informational value of stock prices at any
point in time, as it slows the "market's progress toward an equilibrium
price ."5
Prediction markets do not suffer from any of these shortcomings:
they can be narrowly tailored to specific decisions,5 4 they can be used
internally to assess different future possibilities, and they are not
biased by any laws restricting trading. Prediction markets allow
employees as well as other insiders and market participants to convey
information not just about the overall health of the firm, but about
particular issues facing it. The markets can help alert decisionmakers
to bad decisions or missed opportunities sufficiently early that they
can try to apply pressure to reverse the changed policy. Designs like
the market scoring rule make it easy to bet that a prediction is too
high without trading short.
2. Problems Impeding Information Flow
Not only are stock prices generally insufficient to inform manag-
ers about the wisdom of particular future courses of action, but firm
decisionmaking in general is also complicated by barriers to efficient
information flow. Prediction markets can help avoid the distortions
that occur when gatekeepers decide what information to present to
their immediate superiors, turning information flow into a costly ver-
sion of the children's game "telephone," or, worse, a way of mislead-
ing bosses and corporate stakeholders. At the same time, prediction
markets help avoid the danger that employees will keep information
to themselves lest the information interfere with interpersonal rela-
tionships, reputation, or even job status; this is especially true if anony-
mous trading is permitted. Prediction markets also give the few who
recognize the heuristics and biases of others incentives to trade
against those biases. We will consider how prediction markets can
52 Michael R. Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regula-
tory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAx L. REv. 233, 240 (2004).
53 Id.
54 See Manne, supra note 11, at 185 ("Virtual markets even have some benefits the
actual stock market does not, such as the ability to segregate specific causes of share-
price changes.").
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solve each of these three problems-hierarchy, 
hidden profiles, and
heuristics and biases-in turn.
a. Hierarchy
Decisionmaking in firms is generally hierarchical. 
Every organi-
zation has a single decisionmaker, be it an individual 
or group, that
must make decisions based on all available information. 
The problem
is that the volume of information necessary to 
make a decision is often
overwhelming. Hierarchy and filtering are one 
solution. The head of
each business unit or team or division is 
responsible for getting all
information from that group, synthesizing 
it, and reporting it up the
chain of command. While this approach can 
sometimes lead to an
optimal quantity and quality of information 
reaching the ultimate
decisionmaker, it also has significant costs, 
and opportunistic or self-
interested actors may abuse it.
Consider the information generated by the 
government about
alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. 
The President did not
receive all the information collected by the 
executive branch, but
rather only data filtered through his various 
advisors.5 5 Each of the
various departments, not to mention each of 
their data collectors, may
have had a particular ideological or personal 
agenda. High-ranking
advisors are tasked with filtering and analyzing 
information, but the
data that they received is filtered too by their 
subordinates.
Similar situations obtain in every business 
firm of considerable
size. Replace the word "President" in the above 
with "CEO," and the
political departments with business divisions, 
and the story is the
same. Like the president, the CEO faces decisions 
of consequence,
from certification of financial statements to 
merger decisions, with lit-
tle first-hand observation. The problem of 
information flow is espe-
cially important for today's large, multinational 
firms. With hundreds
of divisions in dozens of countries, a firm 
like General Electric can
prepare financial statements only by aggregating 
those submitted by
each division head or country manager into 
progressively broader
organizational categories.
One potential solution to the informational 
asymmetry problem
is to improve organizational design and 
incentives. This is the most
common response to informational breakdowns, 
both in government
55 Karen DeYoung, Falling on His Sword: 
Colin Powell's Most Significant Moment
Turned Out to Be His Lowest, WASH. PoST MAG., 
Oct. 1, 2006, at 12.
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and in firms. The creation of a Director of National Intelligence 56
and the mandatory internal control provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 200257 are both examples of this type of solution. It is difficult
to align incentives between principal and agent, however, and firms
are always plagued by organizational costs, regardless of how well they
are put together. These costs can be large, especially when individuals
can benefit from deception.58 It may or may not be worthwhile for a
particular organization to invest more money in improving informa-
tion transmission up each level of the hierarchy.
An alternative strategy is to facilitate the flow of information
around the hierarchy. 59 An individual employee who dissents from an
official report or sees a false idea propagating can try to go around the
hierarchy or blow the whistle. These actions, however, are risky,
because reputations and jobs are at stake. Protections for
whistleblowers can encourage employees to raise concerns loudly but
are difficult to calibrate properly. Excessively generous protection can
allow some employees to make large amounts of money on either friv-
olous charges or charges that the employees did little to uncover.
Blowing the whistle can also be a form of job protection, because
some firms may be reluctant to fire employees for fear of bad press or
a lawsuit. Inadequate protection, meanwhile, can lead many employ-
ees to keep their concerns to themselves. Whistleblower provisions, in
any event, seem unlikely to be effective in encouraging the flow of
information in cases where there is no question of illegal conduct.60
56 See Philip Michael Romero, An Immunological Approach to Counter-Terrorism and
Infrastructure Defense Law in Electronic Domains, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 101, 125
(2006).
57 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
58 For a discussion of the difficulties of designing effective incentives, see Bengt
Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 95-99 (1999) and
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
972, 984 (1994).
59 Some firms have developed creative ways to help alleviate the costs of hierar-
chy. For example, Cisco CEO John Chambers hosts a monthly "birthday breakfast"
during which he chats informally with employees having a birthday in that month.
Adams Lashinsky, Lights! Camera! Cue the CEO!, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006 at 27.
Although such sessions may occasionally help improve decisionmaking, their purpose
and real value, if any, is as a morale building tool.
60 A recent example of the limitations of such provisions is Carnero v. Boston Scien-
tific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). In Carnero, the First Circuit held that the
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley were not clearly intended by Congress to
have extraterritorial effect. Id. at 8. Thus, when Carnero was fired after reporting
financial improprieties to Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), an American corpora-
tion, he had no recourse under Sarbanes-Oxley, even though Carnero was employed
by BSC's Argentinian and Brazilian subsidiaries. Id.
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Recent research suggests that whistleblowing, including the new pro-
cedural protections for whistleblowers found in Sarbanes-Oxley, is not
an effective mechanism for uncovering corporate fraud. 61 An
employee who believes that a supervisor has made a good faith but
mistaken decision is unlikely to go over the supervisor's head. Organi-
zations that encourage such insubordination risk exacerbating work-
place tensions and wasting high-ranking officials' time.
Prediction markets provide a much simpler approach to allowing
information to flow to top decisionmakers. They offer several advan-
tages. First, prediction markets can prevent gatekeepers from filtering
and distorting information. For example, allowing individuals to pre-
dict sales would reduce the possibility that errors (either innocent or
profit-seeking) propagate through the hierarchy all the way to the top.
Employees would have incentives to identify and correct distorted
information, especially if they can trade anonymously.
Second, prediction markets can increase the possibility that those
most capable of making accurate predictions will do so. Trades in
prediction markets will be weighted by intensity of belief or knowl-
edge. At times, of course, individuals will be overconfident of their
positions, but on the whole, weighting seems likely to improve infor-
mation. Even if a hierarchical organization picks excellent managers,
predictive capacity is only one aspect of managerial skill. Indeed,
sometimes an organization might want to select managers who are
overconfident about the possibility of achieving success, because these
managers can be effective motivators. Prediction markets may allow
others to compensate for the predictive weaknesses of these manag-
ers, while still allow these managers to coordinate projects.
Third, prediction markets can boil down information to the con-
crete numbers that will be of most interest to top decisionmakers. For
example, markets allowing employees to predict whether the firm will
have to restate its financial statements would provide the CEO a sim-
ple barometer for assessing the veracity and completeness of the
financial statements. This may be more useful, especially for a CEO
not trained in accounting, than a detailed explanation of arcane
accounting decisions. Of course, top decisionmakers will also some-
times rely on hierarchical decisionmaking structures to produce analy-
sis to explain the numbers, but at least the CEO will be able to identify
61 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 4
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482 (finding
that over two-thirds of frauds are identified by individuals outside the firm, and that
Sarbanes-Oxley's enhanced protections have not led to more whistleblowers or better
protection for whistleblowers).
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instances in which the analysis appears to be at variance 
with the con-
sensus prediction.
b. Hidden Profiles
A related problem that prediction markets can 
help overcome is
the tendency for less than all information held by a group 
of individu-
als to be incorporated into group-based decisionmaking. 
Cass Sun-
stein points out that while groups of individuals, 
like the employees of
a firm, have as a group a great deal of valuable information, 
the delib-
erative model used by most firms to aggregate and 
process this infor-
mation is flawed. 62  For one, the social 
pressures within any
organization lead some members to sit quiet even 
though they may
have valuable information to share-an effect 
known as "hidden
profiles. 63 The result is that there 
is an emphasis on information
shared by the group. Bad decisions can cascade 
when managers at
each level of a hierarchy, initially potentially 
open to differing per-
spectives, place aside their conflicting views when 
facing recommen-
dations from subordinates.
Prediction markets can combat both of these concerns. 
Individu-
als who might keep information to themselves 
nonetheless might
trade on that information. Meanwhile, it may only 
take one or a small
number of people who have correctly analyzed a problem 
to trade on
their information and prevent cascades. Of course, 
employees will
often trade on information without explaining their 
reasoning, and so
some information cascades will persist, and liquidity 
constraints of
employees may lead even those who have the correct 
analysis to limit
the degree to which they correct the market. But 
prediction markets
at least should help.
c. Heuristics and Biases
Additional obstacles to information flow arise from 
the heuristics
or mental shortcuts that impede individuals' ability 
to collect and dis-
seminate information effectively and efficiently. 
Recent work in
behavioral economics reports that individual 
employees are risk
averse, are overly optimistic, apply excessively high 
discount rates to
the future, and suffer from other cognitive limitations 
when process-
ing information. 64 Unfortunately, employees most 
affected by such
62 See Cass R. Sunstein, GroupJudgments: Statistical 
Means, Deliberation, and Informa-
tion Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 994 (2005).
63 Id. at 994-96.
64 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive 
Biases, Communications,
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 
649, 673-96 (2006).
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biases may be most likely to succeed. As Donald Langevoort recently
wrote in describing the Enron scandal: "[T]raits such as over-opti-
mism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical
self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments, so
that people who possess them are disproportionately represented in
executive suites. ' 65 This should result not only in the occasional mas-
sive fraud, but also in far more numerous small mistakes that can
decrease firm profitability.
These factors alone or in combination can contribute to potential
problems. For example, risk-averse employees may place great
emphasis on a small danger of losing their jobs. Therefore, they may
go along with bad decisions or even participate in frauds originated at
higher levels. Studies also show that corporate leaders, like most of
us, are plagued by excessive optimism. 66 This trait may cause individu-
als in the information hierarchy to be overconfident in ways the
impede information flow. A sales person might overestimate
expected sales, and, if things do not work out as expected, be tempted
to cover up for fear of being fired. This course of action is especially
likely for individuals suffering from overconfidence bias, because the
bias will apply also to an employee's estimate of the probability of get-
ting away with misbehavior. Even where overconfidence does not
cause employees to break laws or rules, it may lead them to make
excessively optimistic progress reports to their supervisors, ultimately
leading to poor decisionmaking.
Use of prediction markets might allow some frauds to be uncov-
ered by decisionmakers far up the chain of command or outside the
firm, as various individuals would have incentive, be it financial or oth-
erwise, to trade against the official report to management. The mar-
kets effectively give voice to those who otherwise would remain silent
due to various pressures or expected costs from speaking out. The
biases that prevent good decisionmaking may also distort the informa-
tion flow to the market, but the misinformed or overly optimistic
trades of these individuals will attract those with better information
and less bias. Those who are aware of others' cognitive imperfections
65 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others, and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 Gro. LJ. 285, 288 (2004).
66 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 101, 130-48 (1997) (noting that corporate information flows are affected by
managerial optimism, and other problems of managerial heuristics, including cogni-
tive conservatism, decision simplification, and self-serving beliefs).
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will recognize profit opportunities, and their trading should at least
partially correct for biases.
B. Flow of Information to the Markets
So far, we have seen how internal firm prediction markets can
help reduce the error costs of information flow in hierarchical organi-
zations, as well as enable truth telling in a low risk, cost-effective man-
ner. Of perhaps even more relevance to legal scholars and
policymakers is the role these markets can play in improving informa-
tion flow from the firm to shareholders, creditors, and other market
participants. In this subpart, we argue that prediction markets can
prove more effective at transmitting information to markets than sev-
eral other possible strategies: imposing auditing and internal controls,
relaxing insider trading laws, and enhancing mandatory disclosure
requirements.
1. Prediction Markets Instead of Internal Controls
A common element of all the recent wave of corporate scandals
was an apparent breakdown in firms' internal and external auditing
functions, which in theory should bring relevant information to the
markets. For example, at Enron, Andrew Fastow and others manipu-
lated internal reports to serve their personal ends, and Arthur Ander-
sen failed in its obligation to make sure that Enron's financial
statements represented a true picture of the firm. 67 In response,
policymakers in Congress, the SEC, and the newly created Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), adopted a series of
requirements designed to improve the reliability of public disclosures
of financial reports: beefing up accounting expertise and indepen-
dence on boards, banning accountants from selling consulting ser-
vices to firms they serve, requiring annual reports on the efficacy of
new internal control systems for financial reporting, and mandating
financial statement certification by the CEO and CFO.68 Fraudulent
certification carries a possibility of multi-million dollar fines and two
decades in prison.69
While these reforms raise the cost of malfeasance and may help
deter abuses, the consensus is that the costs are high. For example,
67 Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corpo-
rate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 327, 409-10; see Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 39 (2002).
68 Ribstein, supra note 67, at 11-18.
69 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
[VOL. 82:41370
PREDICTION MARKETS FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
several studies show that the burden is so great that 
many firms are
"going private" to avoid the costs, hassle, and legal risks from this
uncertain process. 70 Even supporters, like Langevoort, 
have doubts.
He wonders whether the institution of a "firm-specific 
central intelli-
gence agency. . . to spy on line managers 
and audit both the qualita-
tive and quantitative aspects of their disclosure" 
will be beneficial,
pointing out that the "costs [of such an approach] 
should not be
underestimated." 71 Ultimately, the new approach 
relies on directors
or auditors or other gatekeepers to enforce 
a new discipline on man-
agers, either through new independence requirements 
(for directors
and auditors) or whistleblowing protections (for lawyers 
and employ-
ees). These parties, however, may be complicit in wrongdoings, 
may
be undermotivated to act properly given that 
they may too suffer from
cognitive or other biases, and may be rational 
in not acting to stop an
alleged fraud based on a reasonable calculation 
of their own self-
interest.
As important, the costs of auditing are increasing 
dramatically
without any clear sign that the value of auditing 
services or the finan-
cial information provided by firms is improving. 
Part of the problem
is that no consensus exists on the best approach 
to summarizing audit
information. There are currently vigorous 
debates on accounting
issues ranging from the general approach to firm 
audits (rules or stan-
dards?) 72 to the details of specific types of disclosures (should 
execu-
tive compensation be disclosed in footnotes 
or tables?). 73 Greater
expenditures on audits can reduce the possibility 
that auditors will
miss a red flag, but they will not necessarily ensure 
that information is
conveyed to the market in the most useful, cost-efficient 
manner.
Prediction markets are a potential alternative 
or complement to
Section 404 internal controls,
7 4 allowing information to flow around a
hierarchy rather than merely improving information 
flow up a hierar-
chy. Suppose that a CEO believes that there 
is a possibility that cer-
tain executives have been shifting sales from one 
period into another.
The CEO could create a prediction market 
forecasting whether the
firm will be required to restate its earnings over some 
period of time,
or what the firm's final statement of earnings 
will be. Because most
frauds materialize eventually, traders could profit 
on markets with suf-
70 See Ribstein, supra note 67, at 39.
71 Langevoort, supra note 65, at 315.
72 See Robert Bruce, Flexibility Is Favoured over 
Rigid Reporting, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2006, at 12.
73 See Floyd Norris, Which Bosses Really Care if Shares Rise?, N.Y. 
TIMES,JUne 2, 2006,
at C1.
74 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
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ficiently long time horizons. Or, the market might predict more spe-
cifically whether an investigation into possible earnings shifting will
find wrongdoing in a particular group. Such a market could help
focus investigators' efforts, lowering costs and reducing the danger
that they will reach a premature conclusion.
A similar approach could be applied to any number of current
dilemmas where corporate law and accounting intersect. Prediction
markets could be used to assess whether particular accounting treat-
ments or disclosures will be found to be accurate. An ambitious
approach would create a prediction market corresponding to each sig-
nificant numeric line of a disclosure, forecasting the correct amount
that should be input on the relevant line. The firm could commit to
spending extra resources investigating some percentage of disclosure
lines, say ten percent, chosen at random. The markets could be struc-
tured as conditional markets, anticipating the correct disclosure that
will be identified in an investigation if the particular disclosure line is
selected for a random examination. Using the two-stage market
approach described above, employees could profit from trades even
in cases in which disclosures did not turn out to be randomly selected.
It might appear that these strategies will work only if accounting
rules are refined sufficiently so that there is an objective correct
answer to the relevant accounting questions, but if such refinement
occurs, then prediction markets might seem to be less useful. An
advantage of prediction markets, however, is that they can effectively
aggregate different potential views on questions. For example, if dif-
ferent accounting investigators would be expected to reach different
conclusions about a particular number disclosed, the market will pro-
duce a weighted average of the different views. Prediction markets
can thus work effectively even if some accounting standards remain
vague. Indeed, with prediction markets, vagueness might be prefera-
ble to the extent that it makes it less likely that firms will legitimately
but misleadingly exploit loopholes.
Because managers and firms have only limited incentives to
reform their accounting practices, the impetus for prediction markets
someday might come from regulators. When these markets are suffi-
ciently reliable and the design questions we and others have raised are
addressed, it might be sensible for the SEC or other regulators to
require firms to use these markets to aggregate and process informa-
tion about a firm's fiscal health. Firms would set up or participate in
prediction markets designed to estimate various financial metrics, like
earnings. Even at this relatively early stage, the SEC should consider
testing these markets or encouraging firms to experiment with them,
[VOL. 82541372
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at the very least by assuring firms that such experimentation 
will not
lead to enhanced regulatory scrutiny.
The ongoing debate about the role of external 
auditors in the
recent options backdating scandals illustrates the 
limitations of tradi-
tional approaches. Regulators at the SEC and 
PCAOB argue that
auditors shirked their duties by not investigating 
more fully the grant-
ing of options by the firms they audit, while auditors 
defined their job
in a limited way, arguing that they are not there 
to ferret out wrongdo-
ing and that they should be allowed to take 
firm documents at face
value.75 The role of auditors could be expanded 
to include an investi-
gatory role, or specialized auditors or forensic 
accountants or consul-
tants could be required, but these approaches 
may be costly and
ineffective.
Prediction markets are an alternative. Firms could 
install board-
monitored prediction markets on a set of core 
issues, like whether a
firm's reported earnings are accurate. The 
SEC someday might
require firms to set up these markets or participate 
in markets created
by the SEC itself. Stock exchanges might also sensibly 
require firms to
use such markets as part of listing requirements. 
Finally, state courts
might put real teeth into duty-to-monitor requirements 
by requiring
boards under certain circumstances to deploy 
these markets in a mon-
itoring capacity. Questions remain about how exactly 
to design these
markets, what subjects should be mandatory versus voluntary, 
what
entity is best positioned to require these markets, 
what should be dis-
closed and when, and so on. These issues are 
beyond our scope, and
are, in any event, unresolvable as a theoretical 
matter at this stage in
the evolution of these markets.
2. Prediction Markets Instead of Insider Trading
Another use of prediction markets is as a 
harmless end-run
around insider trading restrictions. Markets 
can give insiders an
incentive to reveal information to the firm and 
the market while mut-
ing the normative concerns that are the 
basis for insider trading
laws. 76 Henry Manne, the leading anti-establishment 
thinker in this
75 See David Reiley, Backdating Woes Beg the Question of Auditors' 
Role, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 2006, at Cl. A related problem is whether 
auditing firms should be permit-
ted to disclose "soft information," such as impressions 
or color about a firm's reported
numbers, or be limited solely to "hard information," 
that is, the numbers themselves.
One would expect auditors to push the limit of 
their obligation to provide soft infor-
mation, while investment bankers and others 
that rely on it to give them the real story
of the firm will push for continuation of the practice.
76 See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the 
Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation, 80 MicH. L. REv. 1051, 1067-71 
(1982).
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area, has long argued that insider trading could increase market effi-
ciency and could help smoke out corporate frauds.7" In a recent arti-
cle, he argued that the success of corporate prediction markets should
highlight the potential benefit of relaxing insider trading laws.7 8
Insider trading, however, may impede the efficient allocation of capi-
tal. On anonymous exchanges, market makers do not know whether
they are trading with someone with inside information or someone
without, so they increase the bid-ask spread in order to compensate
for the risk that the trade is with the former. This increase in bid-ask
spreads reduces the number of possible transactions in the market-
place, and therefore results in less market liquidity.79
Perhaps the most obvious and simple corporate prediction mar-
ket is one that would attempt to replicate the informational compo-
nent of the firm's stock price by simply forecasting future stock
prices. 80 A sample contract might be: "What will Firm X's stock price
be in six months?" The argument against the applicability of insider
trading laws is that participants would not be buying or selling a
"security," a requirement for application of federal securities law. The
key legal questions are whether a prediction market contract qualifies
as a "stock" or as an "investment contract."8' It is almost certainly not
a "stock," because it provides no voting rights, 2 and an investment
contract requires investment in a "common enterprise" 3 rather than
a mere prediction.- The question is not entirely free from doubt, how-
ever. Participants might be considered to be trading in a derivative of
a security, and thus fall within the regulatory ambit of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), though the CFTC's jurisdiction
over prediction markets remains unclear. CFTC jurisdiction seems
less likely for prediction market contracts whose payoffs do not
depend directly on the stock price.
Whatever their present legal status, corporate prediction markets
should generally not be seen as invoking the same normative concerns
77 See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93-110 (1966).
78 See Manne, supra note 11, at 185.
79 Kee H. Cting & Charlie Charoenwong, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ash Spread,
FIN. REV., Aug. 1998, at 1, 8 (reporting the results of an empirical study confirming
that stocks with more insider trading have larger bid-ask spreads).
80 Larry Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 36 (2006).
81 See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376,
383-84, 387-93 (D. Del. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (1) (2000) (providing the
complete statutory definition).
82 See Great Lakes Chem., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (citing United Hous. Found. v.
For-man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)).
83 Id. at 384-85 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946)).
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as insider trading regulation, at least to the same degree. To the
degree that any concern exists, it may depend on who is permitted to
trade. The argument for insider trading rules is particularly weak if
insiders are trading these contracts solely with other employees or
those in contractual privity with the firm. Prediction markets are not
used to raise capital, mitigating concerns about market integrity.
Especially when subsidized, internal prediction markets function
more as job performance inducements than as 401 (k) plans. Insider
trading in public prediction markets may raise greater concerns,
because of the increased possibility that individuals will use prediction
markets for hedging purposes rather than for betting. Even so, nor-
mative concerns seem minimal. Trading in these markets would be
purely voluntary, and anyone who wishes to avoid betting against
insiders could continue to invest in equity or traditional derivative
markets for retirement or other savings. Indeed, by bringing insider
information to the public, and by giving insiders a discrete outlet for
profit, prediction markets should make the playing field in traditional
markets even more level than before.
3. Prediction Markets Instead of More Disclosure Regulation
Prediction markets may also have value as a substitute for (or
compliment of) existing securities disclosure requirements under fed-
eral law. Disclosure is the silver-bullet answer for nearly all corporate
law problems these days. Consider the current flap about executive
compensation made prominent by recent academic work,8 4 an endless
series of media exposes, and the options backdating scandals. While
there are many conceivable regulatory responses, ranging from noth-
ing to tax penalties for certain types of compensation to ceilings, the
SEC's response-new disclosure rules-is hardly surprising. Ever
since President Franklin Roosevelt made Justice Louis Brandeis's slo-
gan about sunlight being the best disinfectant the touchstone of the
securities laws,8 5 disclosure of more information to investors has been
the preferred regulatory response. After seven decades of more and
more mandatory disclosure, the costs and benefits of this regime are
unclear.
If prediction markets prove to be successful and become wide-
spread, however, they could provide an alternative supplement, or
someday perhaps even partially displace the costly mandatory disclo-
sure regime of the securities laws. The fundamental purpose of the
periodic disclosure requirements of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
84 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
85 SeeJOEL SELicMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 41-42 (3d ed. 2003).
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is to provide investors with equal access to relevant information 
about
the firm.8 6 Prediction markets forecasting stock 
price can by them-
selves provide relevant information about insiders' 
views about the
health of the firm as a whole. More focused prediction 
markets can
provide information about particular projects or issues. In theory, 
the
SEC might someday specify certain markets that 
firms must create,
based on experience with which market types 
prove most useful at
providing investors with valuable information. 
In the meantime, if
firms generally develop these markets, certain types 
of mandatory dis-
closure might become less necessary.
Carefully designed prediction markets might provide 
alternatives
to concrete disclosure requirements, including 
new proposals. Con-
sider, for example, Lucian Bebchuk and Robert 
Jackson's call for the
release of information on executive pensions.
87 Disclosure in this
area might be complicated, because of the complex 
nature of pension
agreements, and the contingent nature of some 
executive compensa-
tion. An alternative approach would be to use a 
prediction market to
forecast payments to be made to executives in 
each of a number of
future years, apart from salary. This information 
might be more use-
ful to the market, because market participants 
would not need to
engage in expensive analysis of disclosures about 
pension plans. It
also might be cheaper than producing detailed 
reports, although that
depends on the size of the market subsidy.
The more speculative question is whether prediction 
markets
might substitute for existing disclosure requirements. 
Imagine a
hypothetical firm that has ten projects of varying sizes, risks, 
and
potential returns. Under current law, the firm 
would likely disclose
the existence and basic factual information for each of 
the projects,
including periodic updates when any "material" 
changes occur. The
goal of these disclosures, which often run to tens, 
if not hundreds, of
pages is to provide investors with information 
they need to make
investment decisions, as well as encouraging good 
behavior on the
part of the firm by requiring disclosure.
This regime suffers from serious problems. Few investors actually
read the materials that firms spend so much time 
and money putting
86 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 
(1988) ("We have recognized time
and again, a 'fundamental purpose' of the various 
Securities Acts, 'was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy 
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
industry.'" (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))).
87 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, 
Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823, 852-53 (2005).
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together and distributing."" While average investors may free ride on
those few (professional) investors who do read the information, this
may raise normative concerns about broad and equal access to infor-
mation.8 9 In addition, when deciding what to disclose, the firm must
balance a complicated tradeoff. The threat of legal liability may gen-
erally encourage more disclosure, albeit in a boilerplate fashion that is
not information-rich, while competitive pressures and the desire to
keep strategic secrets may encourage less disclosure. Faced with the
possibility of a strike suit in the event of a decline in the stock price,
firms may choose, as a pre-litigation strategy, to make voluminous but
meaningless disclosures. A firm will list so many generic risk factors
for particular projects that it will be difficult ex ante for an investor to
appreciate which factors are most significant. An additional cost of
the disclosure regime is the litigation, both meritorious and frivolous,
that results as lawyers look for material misstatements or omissions in
each descriptive disclosure.
In a world with well functioning prediction markets, the firm
might instead (or in addition) set up one or more markets for each
project. If the market were a purely internal market, the firm could
disclose the results on a periodic basis; if the market were a public
market, the disclosure would be continuous and ongoing. The ability
of the firm to disaggregate its value into discrete projects, each of
which is tracked based on a prediction market, would provide much
more information and in a more usable form than the current disclo-
sure regime. For example, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem tells us
that investors see through the financial structure of firms to look
directly at the risk of underlying projects.90 In other words, a risky
project funded with equity is still risky, and a safe project funded with
debt is still safe. The idea is that investors can lever and de-lever just
as firms can, and if the market misvalues a firm based on how it is
88 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behav-
ioral Economics About Stockbrockers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 628, 682
(1996) ("[A]necdotal evidence, supported by many people's assumptions about
investment practices, indicates that most nonprofessional investors do not read the
prospectus and other legal disclosure documents they are given." (citing Homer
Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. tAw. 631 (1973))).
89 Regulation FD is a recent regulatory change that recognizes equal access as an
important element of securities law policy. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2006). The
key provision states: "[Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, dis-
closes any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make public
disclosure of that information . . . ." Id. § 243.100(a).
90 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 268-69 (1958).
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financed, the investors can eat up the arbitrage opportunity: 
Whatever
the position taken by the firm, the investors can undo 
this position.91
Prediction markets help reduce the arbitrage costs by 
making project
risk more transparent. The less opaqueness there 
is about project
risk, the fewer inefficiencies that will persist in financing 
decisions and
firm valuation.
In addition, this type of disclosure might alleviate many 
of the
litigation risks firms and investors now face. Firms 
would have less
incentive and ability to deceive investors with faulty or 
insufficient dis-
closures, as the prediction markets would provide 
a natural market
check. In addition, investors of all types would have 
an easy-to-under-
stand metric for evaluating the firm's prospects. 
Moreover, firms
would no longer be able to package disclosures (the good from 
one
project with the bad from another) in a manner that may lead 
to
socially wasteful conduct and investor 
losses.92
Firms' incentives to experiment in improving their 
disclosures
may be limited, because firms are unable to capture 
any competitive
advantage from publicly disclosed innovations.
9 3 Once prediction
markets become better established as decisionmaking 
aids, the SEC
could, as a modest first step, sponsor a pilot program 
designed to
identify best practices for using markets as disclosure 
tools. The SEC
might operate the markets itself, and could choose a disclosure 
topic,
such as executive compensation rules. Some firms would 
be randomly
selected to adopt new rule-based disclosure obligations, 
other firms to
adopt a market designed to provide investors with 
stock-price-like
measure of the firm's compensation practices, and 
still others to
adopt other market designs. Participation could be 
voluntary, and
firms that participate in the pilot program could be compensated 
in a
variety of ways, for example, through exclusive use of 
the design for a
period of time or temporary relaxation of some other 
rules.
C. Objections
There are a number of valid objections to the use of prediction
markets for internal decisionmaking and to convey 
information to
91 Id, at 2 6 9 .
92 See James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want 
Their CEO to Lie More After Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (manuscript 
at 27-29), availa-
ble at http://law.bepre
ss
.co
m / cgi/viewcon ten t .cg
i artcle = 1058&context=usclwps
(discussing the incentives that managers have to bundle good 
and bad disclosures).
93 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up 
the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALEJ. ON
RFG. 139, 153-56 (2003) (explaining why firms may have insufficient 
incentive to
initiate governance innovations).
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markets.9 4 We consider several here: that wealth constraints may pre-
vent employees from trading on information, that employees may be
with a firm for too short a period of time to profit from prediction
markets with long time horizons, that prediction markets may
adversely affect workplace culture, and that managers might not have
the incentives to adopt these markets because of agency costs. (We
have already considered some general objections to prediction mar-
kets, such as the danger of market inefficiency, above.95 ) We believe
each of these objections has merit, but that none is clearly fatal to
expanded use of prediction markets.
1. Wealth Constraints
One concern is that individual employees have limited liquidity,
so they may be unable to trade on information in sufficient volume to
reveal information to the market. In other words, wealthy executives
or shareholders would be able to sway the market in ways that lower-
level employees or individual shareholders could not, even if the latter
group has more accurate information. This concern is most valid for
markets that seek to reveal information that only a very small number
of individuals might have, such as information revealing the occur-
rence of fraudulent activity. Admittedly, there will be some cases in
which so few people have information that the prediction market will
help, but not enough to call attention to an issue at high levels. None-
theless, there will be many other situations in which enough people
have the correct information that they can significantly counteract
misleading statements by corporate officials. For example, many
employees in a group may recognize that their boss is unduly optimis-
tic. Employees could also borrow (known as trading on "margin" in
94 Another possible impediment is that these markets might be illegal in some
cases or subject firms to costly disclosure requirements. As to the law, the primary
obstacles are gambling regulation and federal commodity futures trading regulation.
See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of Mar-
kets in Science Claims, 5 CHAi. L. REv. 159, 165-72 (2002); Tom W. Bell, Prediction
Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEo. MASON L. REv. 37,
59-91 (2006). The academic consensus is that the markets we envision in this Article
should not be illegal, especially given the important positive externalities (and lack of
negative externalities) they will have. Another issue about which some firms appear
to be concerned is how prediction markets might affect their disclosure obligations,
but we do not believe this to be a significant obstacle. Whether firms create internal
reports, hire external consultants to prepare an analysis, conduct a poll of the board
or certain employees, or use a prediction market, the end result-another input for
the decisionmaker-is the same.
95 See supra Part II.A.2.
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equity markets) from professional traders or the firm or even a bank
to finance the trade.
Moreover, in situations in which only a few employees have access
to specific information, external traders may be willing to pay these
employees for the information that they have available. This is a com-
mon practice in equity markets, and there is no reason to think that it
would not work here as well. In the famous case involving the fraud at
Equity Funding,96 the insider who knew about the scam tipped his
friend the stockbroker, who then sold for his account and those of his
clients, thus revealing the fraud.97 Moreover, one can imagine some
trading firms advertising that they will compensate employees who
present them with useful information on which to trade. Arrow's Dis-
closure Paradox presents a potential obstacle here; these firms might
refuse to pay for information and then trade on it anyway.98 But some
firms might acquire reputations for paying for good information and
maintaining employee anonymity, and especially when employee
information is convincing, these firms might be able to effect signifi-
cant market movements. These considerations emphasize the useful-
ness of allowing real money markets in which third parties can
participate.
2. Time Horizons
Employees may be hesitant to trade on prediction markets that
depend on outcomes far into the future. This will be especially true if
employees are forced to cash out their portfolios on leaving a firm.
This consideration, too, argues in favor of real money markets in
which anyone can participate. With cash markets, money invested
could be allowed to earn interest while prediction markets remain
pending,99 so the time value of money should not be an inherent
problem. Even if markets are limited only to employees, however,
prediction markets can still be useful in many contexts. Those with
information implicating effects far into the future will often expect
that the market will at least partially learn this information in a shorter
time frame. An employee could thus trade on the information and
96 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
97 Id. at 659.
98 KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 104, 110-11
(1985).
99 TradeSports pays interest on some deposits. TradeSports Help Page, http://
tradesports.com/aav2/ruesAndFaqs.jsp?heipPage=banking#16 (last visited Mar. 25,
2007).
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make a profit in cashing out of the market well before the issue is
formally resolved.
3. Workplace Culture
Prediction markets also could change firm culture in ways that
might be hard to predict. Will employees be judged on their trading
profits? Will employees who bet against the interests of their superi-
ors be subjected to retribution? Will prediction markets undermine
vital aspects of teamwork and esprit de corps that are essential to a
well-run business? What will firms do with existing systems for budget-
ing, accounting, product analysis, and so on if prediction markets turn
out to be as good or better at forecasting, and would layoffs adversely
affect morale?
We do not know the answers to these questions, and we do not
expect firms or academics to answer them easily or quickly.' 00 None-
theless, our preliminary hunch is that prediction markets are more
likely to improve than detract from workplace culture. 1'0 For many
employees, the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking should
help invest employees in the firm. (Those who do not wish to partici-
pate need not do so; different employees will make different contribu-
tions to the firm.) As all readers of the Dilbert comic know, workplace
culture is not so great already, and a recurring problem for employees
is the need to defer to superiors who may be making foolish decisions.
Increasing information transparency and improving decisionmaking
should make workplaces more pleasant, though admittedly there
might be significant transitional costs.
4. Agency Costs
Agency costs present a possible obstacle to the adoption of pre-
diction markets. Corporate officials reasonably might conclude that
the benefits they personally will obtain from the ability to use predic-
tion markets to assess particular questions might be smaller than the
100 There is some limited discussion of these issues, largely on blogs. See, e.g., Post-
ings of Tyler Cowen to Marginal Revolution, http://www.marginalrevolution.com/
marginalrevoluton/2006/03/why-dont-busine.htm (Mar. 15, 2006, 07:27 EST).
101 Sociological and physiological studies find that even modest changes to work
environments can help improve productivity. Such findings, however, raise the con-
cern that "Hawthorne effects" are present, i.e., that employees perform better simply
because observers (i.e., researchers) are present, and the changes themselves are not
driving increases in productivity. See F.J. ROETHLISBERGER &WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MAN-
AGEMENT AND THE WORKER 14-17 (1939) (finding that any changes in lighting, up to
the point where the workplace was too dimly lit for workers to see their work, pro-
duced increased productivity).
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costs. Managers may not want shareholders to be able to more easily
and more credibly propose changes in strategy; managers may not
want the power to make decisions diffused down the hierarchy; and
managers may not even want more accurate predictions for things like
sales forecasting, because overconfidence by sales managers may be a
signal of a particularly attractive trait and may encourage more work
to meet the unrealistic targets. 10 2
There is no reason, however, that shareholders cannot create
such prediction markets on their own. Even today, third parties might
create prediction markets in jurisdictions in which they are plainly
legal, such as Ireland.'03 For example, lastJune financier Carl Icahn
launched a campaign to change various corporate policies at Block-
buster Inc.10 4 It might be difficult for shareholders to determine
whether Icahn's proposed changes in fact are beneficial. And share-
holders (and the board) may believe Icahn is motivated by short-term
or private value. Icahn, however, could subsidize prediction markets
predicting future stock price contingent on the corporation's future
decision to take or not take a particular step he recommends. Doing
so might help provide an objective data point to shareholders about
the advisability of his plans, and might help advance his goals in any
subsequent proxy contest.
Courts might also encourage the use of these markets, for exam-
ple by taking prediction market assessments into account in assessing
whether directors should be held liable for their decisions, be it
whether to sell firm assets or how much to pay the CEO. Ajustifica-
tion of the business judgment rule, which grants great deference even
to catastrophic decisions, is that the rule protects against hindsight
bias.10 5 After all, litigation results only when corporate decisions turn
102 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2000) ("I find irresistible the inference that the over-
confidence is evolutionarily adaptive.").
103 TradeSports, for example, is based in Ireland, as are TradebetX and Betdaq (a
purely sports-oriented market). See About TradeSports, http://www.tradespons.
com/aav2/aboutUs.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); Betdaq About Us, http://www.bet
daq.com/Ul/Default.aspx (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2007);
TradebetX Home Page, http://www.tradebetx.com (follow "FAQs" hyperlink, then
scroll down to "Contact Us") (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). Betfair, another sports mar-
ket (also known as Flutter), is based in London. See Betfair About Us, http://www.bet
fair.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); see also Papers,
supra note 4 (organizing real-money and play-money prediction markets).
104 See, e.g., Shirley Won, Cost Cutting Perks up Blockbuster Story: Analysts Approve of
Company's Bid to Turn Itself Around in Tough Market, GLOBE & MAIL, June 5, 2006, at B8.
105 See, e.g., Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[The business judgment rule is intended to protect directors
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out badly, and courts are worried that judging decisions in this light
might be especially difficult given what seems like a reasonable busi-
ness decision at time T might seem foolhardy at time T2. Accord-
ingly, courts routinely defer to business judgments so long as they
were made based on a reasonable process and were not self-serving. 10 6
This stingy standard of review makes sense only if the error costs of ex
post judgments are high relative to the gains to be made from the
discipline (both general and specific) ofjudicial review. Contempora-
neous predictions of the effects of corporate decisions, however, do
not suffer from the hindsight problem and therefore could be given
some role in judicial analysis.
Another reason courts engage in little ex post review of business
decisions is a concern about institutional competence. As one court
famously described the justification for the business judgment rule,
'judges are not business experts."10 7 Although this argument seems to
prove too much-courts are not medical experts either, but that does
not stop them from assessing medical malpractice claims-it is never-
theless commonly touted as a reason for deferring to well-considered
business judgments. 08 A related point is an evidentiary one about
private value. Litigants in business disputes often make claims about
corporate or shareholder value that courts fear are conflated with the
complaining shareholders' private value. In other words, a corporate
raider may claim that its plan is designed to increase firm value, but a
court may be concerned that the raider's motivation is to extract
rents. In complex business transactions courts may have a hard time
unpacking these, and therefore may have no choice but to defer to
the incumbent managers.
against just such attacks because their decisions are not to be second-guessed by
courts with the benefit of hindsight.").
106 Consider this recent statement of Delaware law:
Our law presumes that "in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Those
presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If
that is shown, the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demon-
strate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2005) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
107 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
108 See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980); Dan-
iels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990); Scott v. Woods,
730 P.2d 480, 488 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
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Prediction markets, if admissible, can help solve both of these
problems. For example, a shareholder considering a takeover battle
and expecting to challenge a firm's use of takeover defenses could
create a prediction market designed to estimate the impact of the
firm's various options on its stock price. If the market shows that the
shareholder's proposed transaction would create more value than
management's alternative plan (including takeover defenses), then
the court might admit this fact as evidence in any judicial proceeding.
We imagine that prediction markets will play no more than a minor
role in judicial decisionmaking for years after the adoption of condi-
tional markets, but that courts increasingly might focus on them as
the technology underlying them and their reputation improves.
Finally, incentives to use these markets may come from a variety
of other sources, ranging from the SEC or the PCAOB, which could
write rules regarding their usage even before firms deploy them rou-
tinely, to corporate watchdogs or institutional investors, who set gen-
eral standards for corporate best practices. The interviews we
conducted with firms and service providers in this field today suggest
that part of the caution that firms feel about deploying these markets
is regulatory uncertainty-not just whether the markets will be legal
or subject to onerous regulation, but also whether they would be valu-
able in meeting obligations under current law, whether it is Delaware
takeover law or Sarbanes-Oxley or Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). A proactive approach from regulators, defining
how these markets might be used, would, we believe, be an impetus
for firms interested in doing further experiments with these markets.
5. Sabotage
Another general concern about prediction markets is that even if
they improve decisionmaking, they might create other unfortunate
incentives. Most troublesome is the possibility of sabotage, that is, that
someone might do something bad in the real world to achieve predic-
tion market profits. For example, a participation market participant
might set fire to a plant. These risks, however, already exist, and are
in fact greater, on public securities markets. As Robin Hanson points
out, there were some concerns that terrorists might have profited
from the September 11, 2001, attacks, although initial investigations
proved such concerns unfounded. 10 9 In theory, one could already
make a great deal of money by taking a large position shorting Gen-
109 This concern apparently also contributed to the demise of the terrorism pre-
diction market proposed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). See, e.g., Seth Grimes, Futures Shock, 6 INTELUGENT ETrRPmsr 14, 15
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eral Motors (GM) stock, and then blowing up one of its factories. Pre-
diction markets on particular issues facing GM seem unlikely to
increase the risk of sabotage already presented by securities markets,
especially considering the stakes will be much, much smaller in the
prediction markets. The rarity of sabotage suggests that it is not any-
way a big problem, perhaps because of the difficulty of accomplishing
it without being caught.
Corporate prediction markets, however, might in some cases
increase the risk of smaller acts of sabotage. Suppose, for example,
that a prediction market is forecasting a project completion date.
Someone might delay her contribution to ensure receipt of some
profit from a bet against completion. Ordinarily, such acts will be
unlikely, or at least relatively inconsequential, because there will be
generally greater incentives to be a good employee than to make some
money on a prediction market, especially if the employee's motives
could be readily discerned. Relatively high-ranking corporate employ-
ees, meanwhile, will generally have stock options and other incentives
to keep the stock price high, and these incentives will generally out-
weigh any incentives created by prediction markets themselves. In the
end, sabotage incentives can be controlled by limiting subsidies to a
level where the exogenous incentives provided by the markets will be
smaller than the endogenous incentives provided by the structure of
the corporation itself.
III. IMPROVING CORPORATE DEcISIONMAING
So far we have considered using prediction markets to improve
the flow of information within a firm and from a firm to potential
providers of capital. The benefits for shareholders are the possibility
of generally reducing information costs, thus encouraging better
behavior by their agents and reducing agency costs. The use of pre-
diction markets can also be tailored to help solve specific corporate
governance problems or reduce current costs of governance. We
assess two broad sets of corporate governance issues: first, questions of
strategy (including rule-of-the-game decisions, for example about
bylaws or about the use of prediction markets themselves), and sec-
ond, questions about specific major transactions (such as takeovers).
Then, we consider the possibility that prediction markets might be
used not just to maximize shareholder welfare, but also to commit to
considering the interests of other constituencies, such as creditors and
labor. Contracts could constrain corporations to take these other
(2003) ("By supporting trading of assassination futures, is the government condoning
or even promoting illegal and immoral tactics?").
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groups into account, providing an alternative basis for mediating the
interests of different stakeholder interests.
A. Corporate Strategy
The first potential application of prediction markets in corporate
governance is to improve shareholder consideration of certain corpo-
rate transactions. Shareholder participation in management deci-
sions is limited, and for good reason. But shareholders do vote on
some fundamental transactions and are permitted to express their
voice on a variety of other matters. In this subpart, we consider how
prediction markets can improve the current system for shareholder
participation in firm governance, including "rules of the game" deci-
sions such as when prediction markets should generally be deployed,
as well as how they might be used in takeovers and other voting bat-
tles. Finally, we consider how prediction markets are superior to mar-
kets for corporate votes, which are implicitly developing in many of
these areas.
1. Shareholder Proposals
The ability of shareholders directly to control corporate policy is
extraordinarily limited. Having shareholders participate in opera-
tional decisions is unnecessary (given the liquidity of capital markets
and the ability of investors to sell their shares and make other invest-
ments in case they disagree with management), would be grossly inef-
ficient (given the heterogeneous preferences and small stakes of
investors, and their lack of information and incentive to acquire it),
and would defeat the many purposes of delegating decisionmaking in
the first place. The business judgment rule and other well-established
corporate law doctrines are manifestations of this policy choice. This
is not controversial, but beyond this, consensus among corporate
scholars breaks down. Some scholars and regulators believe that
increasing shareholder voice will improve corporate governance,
while others are comfortable with a weak shareholder model of the
public firm.
Among the former group, commentators have called for an
increased role for shareholders, especially institutional investors, in
corporate governance. Bernard Black, for one, argues that institu-
tional investors can supplement board-based decisionmaking in gov-
ernance because of the well-documented potential for abuse and
because such investors have the "incentives and competence . . .to
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address issues that are common to a number of companies."' 10 The
SEC's proposed (but floundering) rule that would allow shareholders
access to the proxy to nominate directors under certain circumstances
would be a relatively limited manifestation of the argument that share-
holders should play a more active role in firm decisions. 1  A more
expansive approach comes from Lucian Bebchuk, who argues that
shareholders should be empowered to intervene in "rules-of-the-
game" decisions, like adopting takeover defenses or the state of incor-
poration, 12 and in "game-ending" decisions, like mergers or asset
sales.Y1 3 Bebchuk documents potential abuses in these cases, showing
how managers can entrench themselves and how their behavior can
be self-serving and largely unchecked in final periods.
There is a rival school-call them the "traditionalists"-who
believe that the current model of strong managers, weak owners, to
use Mark Roe's phraseology,11 4 is the best available model." 5 Ste-
phen Bainbridge argues that corporate law statutes manifest a strong
preference for board decisionmaking authority, noting that "manage-
rial discretion is the default presumption" and concluding that there
is a "strong efficiency justification" for the separation of ownership
and control with a limited role for shareholder policing of director
accountability. 1 6 This view is supported by Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel's insight that corporate governance frameworks are
priced into a firm's cost of capital, giving firms incentives to choose
governance forms that maximize shareholder returns."1 7 In a series of
articles written over the past twenty-five years, corporate lawyer Martin
Lipton has defended the strong board, calling proposals to increase
110 Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evi-
dence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 897 (1992).
111 Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
112 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 844 (2005).
113 Id. at 896.
114 MARmJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
115 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759,
1762 (2006).
116 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006).
117 FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, TmE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 18 (1991).
1387
(VOL. 82:4
- - -~ . ~..-. . s~ D~X7Ir\&T
1388 NOTRE DAEvr W REVIE
shareholder voice "an attack on the most basic 
principles underlying
the American corporatio
n
.'
' ' s
The debate between these rival schools rages 
on, but for now let
us put these large issues in brackets, putting 
aside the question of
whether we should encourage more shareholder 
voice or in exactly
what cases it is most appropriate. We will 
come back to this shortly.
For now, we would like to consider how shareholder 
voice can be most
efficiently encouraged, assuming it is a good 
idea in some or all cases.
The current model for shareholder participation 
in nonfunda-
mental transactions (i.e., other than mergers, choosing 
the board,
etc.) is the "precatory proposal," which allows shareholders 
to put pro-
posals of various kinds before other shareholders 
and to have the cor-
poration solicit proxies on the proposal 
for them on the corporation's
proxy statement. 
1 9 This might appear to give shareholders 
consider-
able power, but the rule makes clear that 
corporations can exclude a
proposal from the proxy statement for 
any of a number of reasons.
The results, in any event, are not binding 
on the firm, at least in the
most important corporate law jurisdiction, Delaware.1
20 Under Dela-
ware law, at least by default, the affairs of 
a Delaware corporation are
managed by the board of directors,1
2 1 so shareholder proposals can-
not direct particular directions in policy.
118 Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids 
in the Target's Boar-
droom: Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing 
War, 60 Bus. LAW. 1369, 1376 (2005)
[hereinafter Lipton, Twenty-Five Years]; see also Martin Lipton, 
Takeover Bids in the Tar-
get's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 115-16 (1979) ("[Tihe 
policy considerations are
overwhelmingly in favor of specific recognition 
that the directors not only have the
right to make takeover decisions based on their 
reasonable business judgment, but
that macroeconomic issues must be considered 
along with the long-term interests of
the shareholders and the company as a business 
enterprise.").
119 Brett H. McDaniel, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder 
Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3
BELRvxLY Bus. L.J. 205, 253-54 (2005); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 
(2006) ("This section
addresses when a company must include a 
shareholder's proposal in its proxy state-
ment and identify the proposal in its form 
of proxy when the company holds an
annual or special meeting of shareholders. In 
summary, in order to have your share-
holder proposal included on a company's proxy 
card, and included along with any
supporting statement in its proxy statement, 
you must be eligible and follow certain
procedures.").
120 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 742, 1531, 1642 (2001); 
id. tit. 8, § 141(a). For exam-
ple, the corporation can exclude a proposal 
that relates to the redress of a personal
claim or personal benefit, if it does not relate 
to operations accounting for less than
five percent of earnings or gross sales, if it is 
about day-to-day operations, or if it "is
not a proper subject for action by shareholders under" state 
law. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i).
121 DFL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 742, 1531, 1642 (financial institutions); 
id. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (general corporations).
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Skepticism about the importance and value of these proposals is
borne out by the fact that shareholders do not generally use precatory
proposals to resolve disputes about business strategy. Proposals are
used primarily for political causes, ranging from boycotting apartheid
in South Africa 122 to animal rights12 1 to studying universal health
insurance, 124 which are often far removed from questions of profit
maximization. These proposals rarely receive the majority of the vote
that would be necessary to win, and in any event are nothing more
than recommendations that have no binding legal effect on firms.
The average cost per firm of the precatory proposal process, including
deciding, printing, postage, and other costs, is almost $100,000 per
firm, which means U.S. firms spend over $100 million per year on
proposals that are largely meaningless in terms of firm behavior.125
The costs of voting on precatory proposals thus might appear too
great to justify the benefits, at least from the perspective of the firms
themselves.
Sometimes, however, proposals important to firm governance are
offered. For example, according to data from Institutional Share-
holder Services (ISS), there were 1042 shareholder proposals in the
2003 proxy season, of which about seventy-six involved poison pills.' 2 6
This is a very small number, but the governance issue is sufficiently
important that it may be enough to justify the precatory proposal
machinery. The challenge is separating the proposals that might help
solve collective action problems among diffuse shareholders (like
majority election of directors) from those that serve ends such as polit-
ical activism. A relatively modest use of prediction markets might be
to use them to decide, or at least to recommend, whether shareholder
proposals should be included on a proxy statement. Many of the
bases for exclusion are designed to screen out frivolous requests,
because it may not be worth wasting the corporation's resources and
shareholders' time on proposals that are irrelevant.
122 The SEC has permitted such proposals in many cases. See, e.g., Raytheon Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 556 (Mar. 28, 1990); USG Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 450 (Mar. 12, 1990).
123 Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985) (pro-
posing an investigation into methods of production of foie gras by a French supplier).
124 See, e.g., N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1432
(2d Cir. 1992) (proposing a study of national health care policy).
125 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 67 SEC Docket 373 (May 21, 1998).
126 See Stephen M. Brainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal 10
(UCLA Law & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 3-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=470121.
1389
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
A simple solution would be to use conditional prediction markets
to anticipate the proportion of shareholders who would vote for a pro-
posal if it were placed on the ballot. Participants in this prediction
market would recognize that shareholders ultimately will vote against
both proposals that they disagree with and proposals that they believe
are issues that are not appropriate for shareholder resolution. If the
threshold were set at, say, twenty-five percent, the corporation could
easily avoid proposals with little chance of passage, but managers
would not be able to exclude relatively serious ones. (At the height of
the battle over investment in South Africa, divestment proposals rou-
tinely received less than fifteen percent of the vote.) This approach
could supplant (or perhaps initially supplement) the current "no-
action" letter review by the SEC.
A more ambitious use of prediction markets would be as a substi-
tute for, or alternative to, shareholder proposals themselves, rather
than merely as a new form of gatekeeper. Assuming, as a theoretical
and practical matter that more shareholder "voice" on issues beyond
what is currently considered appropriate is, at least occasionally, bene-
ficial, a conditional market might assess the impact on stock price of a
strategic decision or other contingency. As with existing shareholder
proposals, such prediction markets need not constrain the corpora-
tion's decisionmakers, although such markets might make managers
and directors hesitate before making value-reducing decisions (or
before foregoing value-increasing decisions).
The principal advantage of prediction markets over shareholder
voting on proposals is informational. Each shareholder has only a
limited incentive to study the relevant shareholder proposal. (In cases
in which shareholders are not anonymous, some shareholders also
may have an incentive to vote in a way that pleases the corporation's
directors.) Perhaps some large shareholders, such as institutional
shareholders, will study a question in some detail and perhaps dis-
tribute information about it to other shareholders, but because they
reap only some of the benefits from doing so, their efforts will gener-
ally be suboptimal. The incentive problem is made worse by the fact
that the proposals are not binding, thus reducing even more the
incentive to collect information.
This problem is not solved by contractual arrangements that con-
solidate information gathering factions in a centralized body, such as
ISS. Although specialization and economies of scale may reduce these
costs, the incentives are still not aligned, because significantly less
than all shareholders will compensate ISS for its services. A further
weakness is that the proposals and information gathered by investors
and specialists like ISS are only tenuously linked with changes in firm
[VOL. 82:41390
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value. For example, ISS may recommend a vote for a proposal sug-
gesting removal of a poison pill, but the argument will be a general
dislike of these provisions. ISS will not project an impact on stock
price, or support its analysis with data.
While the proffered reason for or against a particular proposal
may be couched in economic terms, the true grounds are often the
political or private interests of large pension funds or other large
shareholders, who are the primary constituents of ISS.12 7 Lipton
argues that special interest shareholders, like unions and public pen-
sion funds, pressure boards to vote the way they want "without consid-
eration, perspective or even interest in the long-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders as a whole."'12  The problem,
according to critics of shareholder "activism," is that shareholders with
private interests not shared by other shareholders-perhaps short-
term profit-seeking interests or political interests-couch their pro-
posals and votes in terms of overall shareholder value, thereby deceiv-
ing the firm or other voters about the best course of action.1 29
Prediction markets, in contrast, can solve many of these
problems. Prediction markets provide a neutral, objective estimate of
the impact of the proposed strategy or action on firm value. Moreo-
ver, they solve the problem of rational ignorance. Even if only a small
number of people participate in the markets, those people will have
strong incentives to conduct research and to become informed about
the issues. Third parties, such as large shareholders or would-be
shareholders, might be permitted to propose policy directives for pre-
diction markets to consider. An investor could detail a particular pro-
posal, and conditional markets would predict stock price or stock
price changes at some point in the future if the proposal were
accepted or rejected. An investor also might be allowed to offer a
proposal alternative to ones already being considered (whether initi-
ated by the managers or shareholders), resulting in the creation of an
additional prediction market.
In a recent radio commentary, Ian Ayres proposed a new mecha-
nism for expressing shareholder voice: A certain number of share-
holders would be chosen at random in a lottery (weighted by share
ownership), and this group would deliberate on a particular issue, like
127 See, e.g., Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. (forthcom-
ingJune 2007) (manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract902900 (argu-
ing that "conflicts of interest within some governance firms cast doubt on the
reliability of their proxy advice and governance ratings").
128 Lipton, Twenty-Five Years, supra note 118, at 1377.
129 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. Rev. 561, 593-97 (2006).
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how much the CEO should be paid or whether 
to adopt a new strat-
egy, which would then be transmitted to the board 
as the official rec-
ommendation of the shareholders, either 
before or after a
shareholder vote on the issue.
1 3 While this proposal is innovative and
somewhat related to the one we propose, it suffers 
from the problems
that plague group decisionmaking that 
we addressed briefly above. 131
In addition, any given random group might reach 
a decision different
from the one that most groups would reach. 
A prediction market
along the same lines would not be subject to these problems, 
and
would enable firms to reduce agency and decisionmaking 
costs with-
out running the risk of increasing error costs.
Managers may be reluctant to deploy these markets, 
and they may
prefer the current regime for shareholder voice 
precisely because it is
broken. Shareholder actions that are not frivolous 
and costly typically
threaten incumbent management power. Managers 
may not want a
mechanism that identifies frivolous proposals, 
because that mecha-
nism may make it more difficult to fight the 
meritorious proposals.
Accordingly, it is important that third parties, 
like investors, be able to
propose and deploy these markets. The SEC 
someday might also con-
sider requiring firms to use these markets 
to evaluate precatory
proposals.
Moreover, prediction markets may help resolve 
the debate
between those who prefer strong shareholders 
and those who prefer
strong managers. The use of prediction markets 
by managers, boards,
shareholders, or other stakeholders should 
discipline firm decision-
making more efficiently than shareholders currently 
can. The current
mechanism for shareholder discipline is the takeover 
or proxy battle,
both of which are sufficiently rare that some 
critics believe they are
generally ineffectua l .1
32 Prediction markets, in contrast, would allow
shareholders a mechanism to convey credible 
market assessments to
decisionmakers, would allow underinformed 
boards to sanity-check
managerial claims, and would allow managers 
to avoid making value-
destroying decisions. In each case, the mere 
existence of prediction
markets and their potential application might 
be sufficient to con-
strain agent overreaching. Therefore these 
markets simultaneously
130 Marketplace: Interview with Ian Ayres-How 
to Strengthen Shareholder Democracy
(Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast July 6, 2006), available 
at http://marketplace.public
radio.org/shows/2006/07/06/PM200607065.html.
131 See supra Part I1.A.2.
132 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders 
Set the Rules, 119 HARv. L. REv.
1784, 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 2007).
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lower the cost of shareholder voice while making shareholder voice
less necessary.
2. Rules of the Game
The same techniques that could be used to assess corporate strat-
egy in general can be applied to forecast the impact of potential
changes in corporate governance. For example, a corporation consid-
ering changes to its bylaws might predict the immediate stock price
effect of an announcement of such changes. A corporation also
might use prediction markets to assess the wisdom of adopting or dis-
carding defensive tactics even in the absence of an actual takeover
attempt. Similarly, a corporation might use a prediction market to
assess the impact of reincorporating in another jurisdiction. 13 3
Without venturing into the realm of the ridiculous, it is possible
that prediction markets might be used even to make decisions about
prediction markets' role in corporate governance. We have seen that
prediction markets might be used to determine when shareholder
proposals should be presented for shareholder votes, and also that
prediction markets might provide an alternative to such votes. Com-
bining these ideas, prediction markets might be used to determine
when prediction markets should be used as an alternative to share-
holder votes. A prediction market might be used to determine
whether to create another specific prediction market, or to determine
whether to use prediction markets in some class of situations. Moreo-
ver, prediction markets, perhaps normative prediction markets, 34
might be used to determine the degree to which other prediction
markets should be subsidized. Of course, corporate decisionmakers
will need to decide at least whether to create the prediction market
that makes decisions about other prediction markets, and also to
determine how much to subsidize this initial prediction market.
The recognition that prediction markets can be used to make
decisions about prediction markets suggests an answer to an objection
to the use of prediction markets for corporate governance: Even if
prediction markets are sufficiently accurate, we might not want corpo-
rations to rely on them, because sometimes it is useful for corpora-
tions to precommit to particular courses of action. Based on work by
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott that eventually contributed to a
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, economists recognize that some-
133 See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover
Statutes, 61 FonRAm L. REv. 843, 845 (1993) (discussing the dominance of Delaware
in the interstate competition for incorporations and reincorporations).
134 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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times institutions can maximize their welfare through precommit-
ment. 13 5 In the corporate context, a corporation might want to
commit to maintaining a particular corporate strategy because poten-
tial suppliers, other business partners, or customers will be willing to
act in ways that will benefit the corporation only if they remain confi-
dent that the corporation will follow through on its initial plans. In
effect, a prediction market determining or recommending bylaw pro-
visions on prediction markets is determining when it is advisable for
the corporation to precommit not to use prediction markets. Predic-
tion markets also might be used to make other forms of precommit-
ment. Indeed, whenever a prediction market is used to determine
whether to enact a particular bylaw or corporate charter change, the
prediction market is being used to assess the wisdom of making some
kind of precommitment.
3. Takeovers and Other Major Corporate Transactions
One of the most debated issues in corporate law is the govern-
ance of firms that are takeover or merger targets. Prediction markets
might be useful not only as a means of making recommendations
about general policy, but also in deciding whether a corporation
should engage in particular "fundamental" transactions, such as merg-
ers, acquisitions, or asset sales. This is an area where, for the most
part, shareholder participation-in the form of a vote-is required by
state law. For example, in the case in which one firm wants to acquire
another firm through a statutory merger, all states require the major-
ity consent of the target firm's shareholders. 136
Some scholars have argued against shareholder voting mecha-
nisms serving as the basis for determining whether a target corpora-
tion agrees to be acquired. Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz note
that a general problem with voting, different voters (in this case,
shareholders) having different interests in the vote, is acute in the
takeover context.137 Gilson and Schwartz distinguish "management
shareholders," specifically "members of current management and
individuals and entities who would do better if the takeover were
defeated, such as unions and, perhaps, suppliers and customers,"
from "independent shareholders," that is, "those who benefit from
135 Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsis-
tency of Optimal Plans, 85J. POL. ECON. 473, 477-80 (1977).
136 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c) (2001 & Supp. 2006).
137 Ronald]. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring
Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 783, 792-93 (2001).
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their shares only as shareholders."'13 8 Managers may be inclined to
vote against the offer, because they would lose theirjobs if their firm is
acquired. Management's assessment of the value of the firm's shares
once acquired (that is, the adequacy of the deal premium) therefore
includes private value that inures solely to the incumbent managers.
Management shareholders may be more motivated to vote, and may
seek to use the corporate information machinery to discourage others
from approving a transaction, and so voting may reject efficient
takeovers.13 9
Another problem that complicates firm voting is the heterogene-
ity of interests of various nonmanagement shareholders. Merger arbi-
trageurs typically make substantial bets on both the target and the
acquirer after a merger is announced. A frequent approach is to "lock
in the spread" by buying the target and shorting the acquirer. 140
There may be situations in which their short interests in the acquirer
will lead merger arbitrageurs to favor completion of an acquisition,
even when there might be some other potential acquirer who would
offer a more favorable deal. Potentially more troubling still is the pos-
sibility that hedge funds or other large players might enter into trans-
actions that give them large voting stakes without economic risk. 41
For example, in one recent attempted acquisition, a hedge fund with
a large stake in the target firm wanted to ensure that the deal went
through at the premium announced, even though market sentiment
quickly turned against the deal, and thus obtained votes in the
acquirer.1 42 The reverse could happen as well, with a hedge fund
acquiring votes but no economic interest in a target because of its
interest in the acquirer.
Gilson and Schwartz suggest that this heterogeneity of investor
interests means that the Delaware courts should reverse their prefer-
ence for elections over markets. 43 The market mechanism that Gil-
son and Schwartz have in mind is the tender offer, that is, offering
138 Id. at 797.
139 Id. at 798-99.
140 For an explanation of this practice, see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encum-
bered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 810-11.
141 We consider the efficiency of markets for votes below. See infra Part III.A.4.
Our immediate concern is the danger that parties may acquire votes because of inter-
ests unrelated to any ownership interest in the firm whose votes are acquired.
142 For differing takes on the problem, compare David Skeel, Behind the Hedge,
LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 28, 32 (describing the tactic as "rigging" and "manipu-
lating" the deal), with Posting of Dale Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, http://law
professors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2005/I0/hedgefund-para.html (Oct. 27,
2005) ("This strategy is not as dangerous as Skeel and others make it out to be.").
143 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 789-90.
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each individual shareholder the opportunity to sell shares separately
from the collective decision.14 4 The literature has demonstrated, how-
ever, some problems associated with tender offers. In some cases, a
rational shareholder who wants a bid to succeed might not tender, 145
but in other cases, a rational shareholder who wants a bid to fail might
tender anyway.146
Some proposed reforms may improve results, but voting regimes
have systematic problems that likely cannot be solved. Lucian
Bebchuk and Oliver Hart point out that shareholder voting on spe-
cific acquisitions will work well when an affirmative shareholder vote is
a necessary and sufficient condition for the acquisition to occur.1 47
They do not, however, directly confront the arguments of Gilson and
Schwartz about the propensity of different shareholders to vote. 148
Paul Edelman and Randall Thomas take what they describe as an
"intermediate position,"1 49 concluding that "shareholders should be
able to vote to remove any defensive tactic that is interfering with the
right to sell or vote their stock,"' 50 but that the target's board be
allowed to delay such votes for a limited period of time, no greater
than thirteen months. 151 Such delays may be less than ideal, and the
proposal still depends on shareholders having sufficient knowledge to
make informed decisions about whether to remove defensive tactics.
An alternative approach would be to use prediction markets to
predict the value of the proposed transaction for the target, allowing
each shareholder to receive an assessment of the value that is not
biased by private values, short-term liquidity positions, or undisclosed
interests that may conflict with the valuation assessment. For exam-
ple, a conditional market could assess the value of any consideration
received for the target's shares at some point in the future after con-
summation of the transaction being considered. Although this is
ostensibly what the public stock price is designed to measure, the
144 Id. at 792-94.
145 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 1 BELLJ. ECON. 42, 44 (1980).
146 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Cor-
porate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1719 (1985).
147 See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for
Corporate Control 22 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Discussion Paper No. 336, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-292883.
148 Bebchuk and Hart note in a footnote simply that the Gilson and Schwartz
model and others "focused on issues other than the ones we analyze." id. at 3 n.2.
149 See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover
Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 486-87 (2005).
150 Id.
151 Id.
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shortcomings outlined above may cause distortions 
in this valuation in
these special cases, as well as the general 
noise and information
problems in stock prices identified above. 
Bebchuk and Hart worry
that it is difficult for relatively uninformed 
individuals to determine
from stock prices alone whether to accept 
takeover bids, because
those prices are endogenous; that is, they reflect 
not only any benefit
of the transaction, but also the market's assessment 
of the probability
that the transaction will occur.
1 52
In theory, prediction markets could solve 
the long-standing
debate about defensive tactics and the duties 
of the board in funda-
mental corporate transactions. Using prediction 
markets to predict
the value, other than private value, that each 
shareholder will receive
if an acquisition is or is not accepted has at 
least some advantages over
alternative approaches. Unlike a shareholder 
vote, there is no danger
that different intensity of preference will lead 
to an embrace of ineffi-
cient transactions. At the same time, participants 
in the prediction
market would not be making individual decisions 
about whether to
tender securities, and so prediction markets 
would not present any
conflict in which an individual tender decision 
might conflict with the
individual's preferences. Participants in the 
prediction market would
have incentives to consider that if a particular 
bid were denied, the
bidder or some third party might offer a higher 
bid.
Markets in the takeover context are particularly 
useful because
they help constrain corporate actors to act 
in the interest of share-
holders. But markets are also useful for the 
general reason identified
in Part II, that they reduce the costs and 
distortions of information
flows within a firm, allowing decisionmakers 
better access to valuable
information necessary to make reasoned and 
fully informed decisions.
Commentators frequently point to the merger 
transaction process as
evidence of broken corporate governance. 
The CEO of a firm has
proposed to the board a merger with a competitor. 
The board must
decide whether to approve the merger 
and on what terms. The
board, however, is composed of part-time 
employees without day-to-
day experience or access to information 
except through the CEO.
The CEO "can thus present a. . . merger 
in a way so as to avoid or
undermine any board critical evaluation 
of it."153 Recognizing this
limit on their ability to gauge the true value 
of the merger, and recog-
nizing that the public market's reaction 
includes the noise of self-
interested arbitrageurs, short sellers, speculators, 
and profit takers as
152 Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 147, at 5.
153 See James A. Fanto, Breaking the Merger Momentum: 
Reforming Corporate Law Gov-
erning Mega-Mergers, 49 Burr. L. REv. 249, 293 
(2001).
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well as long-term holders of the firm's equity, 
the board could con-
struct a prediction market to process its informational 
decision more
effectively.
These markets might also overcome the problems 
that nonexpert
courts have in performing valuation. When courts 
engage in valua-
tion analysis today, whether in a postmerger appraisal 
proceeding or a
bankruptcy proceeding, the valuation decision 
is based primarily on
the court's view on a battle of experts. This approach 
has serious limi-
tations, since these presentations can be highly 
technical, biased by
events or information revealed after the decision 
in question, and
include private value considerations that may 
be hard to disaggregate.
Instead, courts could rely on prediction markets 
established by others.
For example, a court could rely on a prediction 
market that would
estimate the value of a dissenting shareholder's 
shares during the
appraisal process. Conceivably, courts someday 
might establish pre-
diction markets themselves. A court, for example, 
could use the nor-
mative market approach discussed above, in 
which the market would
estimate the valuation that some neutral party 
would choose. In the
shorter term, courts might allow litigants to present 
prediction market
results as evidence and place great weight on 
the results if the markets
have been designed properly.
One specific valuation application of prediction 
markets would
be to help reduce uncertainty in bankruptcy. 
In a recent article,
Douglas Baird and Donald Bernstein argue that 
expected variance in
valuation results in observed deviations from 
the absolute priority
rule.154 In traditional valuation, there is no market 
transaction, so it is
"the bankruptcy judge's perspective-and how senior and 
junior
investors perceive it-that counts."
155 The uncertainty of the judicial
valuation process "generates option value"'
56 for various junior claim-
ants, and senior claimants are willing to compensate 
them for that,
even in cases in which all parties "share the same 
view of the business's
prospects." 157 Baird and Bernstein propose several 
possible solutions
to the problem of valuation uncertainty, including 
court-appointed
experts and various procedural changes that encourage 
parties to sub-
mit nonextreme valuations.
158 A prediction market forecasting the
estimate of a court-appointed expert would provide 
an objective, mar-
ket-based assessment that could reduce valuation 
uncertainty. Even
154 Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute 
Priority, Valuation Uncertainty,
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 
1937-44 (2006).
155 Id. at 1943.
156 Id. at 1959.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1969.
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absent judicial reliance on this prediction market, creditors or credi-
tor tranches might independently use these markets to estimate firm
value.'15 9 These markets at least could reduce the possibility that par-
ties would have different assessments of the outcome of litigation,
reducing the need for litigation to occur.
Two additional uses of prediction markets along the same lines
are worth briefly considering. The first is in freezeout transactions
where valuation problems may allow value-destroying transactions to
proceed and may prevent value-creating transactions from occurring.
Under state law, owners of a certain percentage of a firm's stock (typi-
cally ninety percent) can cash out the minority shareholders through
a statutory short-form merger that does not require a shareholder
vote. 160 The danger is that majority shareholders may abuse this
power and their informational advantage to cash out minority share-
holders at prices that undervalue their shares.
The Delaware courts' solution to this potential for abuse is an ex
post judicial valuation proceeding in which the majority shareholders
must show that the transaction is "entirely fair," which includes both
procedural fairness (usually through a "special committee" of so-
called "independent directors") and price fairness. 161 There are at
least two problems with this approach. First, courts, even the specialty
Delaware courts, may have difficulty accurately determining a fair
value for shares given the informational asymmetries and their own
institutional competence. Second, firms are, after the recent decision
in In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,162 deploying a new tech-
nique-tender-offer freezeouts-to avoid entire fairness review
altogether.1 63
The most commonly articulated solution is primarily a procedu-
ral one that tries to replicate an arm's-length transaction-a review by
a disinterested special committee of directors followed by a vote of the
minority shareholders. I64 As described above, there are obvious
problems with voting in such cases, and minority shareholders may
still have less than the best available information about the value of
their shares. A prediction market could be used to value these shares
159 Baird and Bernstein suggest the possibility of market-oriented mechanisms to
reduce valuation uncertainty. See id. at 1963-65.
160 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
161 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (hold-
ing that the judicial standard for evaluating cash-out merger by dominating share-
holder is "entire fairness").
162 No. CIV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
163 See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 19 (2005).
164 Id.
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more easily. This technique could be deployed by acquiring firms,
target firms, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or perhaps
even the courts.
A second additional potential use would be for estimating the
value of private firms. Many legal disputes in closely held corpora-
tions and other private business forms arise because valuations are dif-
ficult in the absence of a market for the firm's securities. Private
equity firms that specialize in valuing these firms rely on costly due
diligence reviews and expert analysis, and ultimately rely on a compar-
ison with prior deals with similar firms or with public firms. The costs
and uncertainty of accomplishing valuation through litigations inhibit
efficient ex ante contracting and capital raising. Firm stakeholders
are subject to abuse by controlling shareholders in the absence of an
easy way to exit the firm with some reasonable certainty about getting
fair value for their stake. Prediction markets may help alleviate these
uncertainties in the same way that they do for public firms. Indeed, a
firm that recently formed intends to provide market-oriented valua-
tions for private firms. 165
4. Prediction Markets Instead of Markets for Votes
Both of these potential applications of prediction markets-for
shareholder voice and for takeovers-resemble a market for votes, in
which shareholders (or even third parties) can participate in corpo-
rate decisionmaking through borrowing or buying share voting rights,
with the economic rights either decoupled from or hedged away. 166
Some commentators believe that we are moving toward, if not already
in, a world in which vote buying (through borrowing and other
means) is common, especially for contentious issues. 167 For example,
in a recent survey of vote borrowing and buying, Henry Hu and Ber-
nard Black conclude that the practice of voting shares not "owned"
and voting shares with no economic interest is widespread, and that
"[c]leverness in vote buying. . . may well become important for suc-
cess" in takeovers and other corporate governance matters. 168 An
empirical study by several finance scholars supports this claim, finding
that share borrowing increases significantly immediately preceding
165 See Numeria Home Page, http://nuneria.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
166 See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 140, at 804-09.
167 See, e.g., id.; see also Susan E.X. Christoffersen et al., Vote Trading and Informa-
tion Aggregation 31-33 (ECGI-Finance, Working Paper No, 141/2007, 2007), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686026).
168 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership: Taxon-
omy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. LAW 1011, 1026 (2006).
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"record-dates," that is the date on which "ownership" of the vote of a
particular share is determined.
169
The prediction markets described above may be superior 
to any
conceivable market for votes. One of the biggest 
complaints about
the shadow market for corporate votes is the 
lack of transparency to
other voters, to the firm, and to the public. A more 
open and official
market for corporate votes, in which a market 
price was established
for the votes of individual shares, could solve that 
problem, however.
The scholarly consensus is still developing on this 
issue. Saul Levmore
identifies a paradox that presents a significant 
problem with a market
for votes: The value of any share is worth very 
little while the value of a
large block of shares is high.
170 Accordingly, individuals entitled to
vote (say through share ownership) are likely to sell their 
votes "at
trivial prices"'171 absent a way of coordinating because 
if they hold out
there are many others willing to sell for a nonzero 
amount.172 There
is no guarantee that anyone will buy votes at more 
attractive prices at
any point in the future, because someone will 
be willing to buy votes
only so long as it is possible to obtain a majority. Each individual
shareholder may have an incentive to sell voting 
rights to someone
who has a private economic incentive to use 
those voting rights in a
way that will harm the shareholders' collective 
economic interests.
Levmore concludes that "competition among 
buyers [may]
allay[ I] sellers' fears of selling too cheaply because of their collective
action problem,"' 73 especially in the corporate 
law context where
mechanisms like the tender offer allow some protections 
against these
problems.' 7 4 Richard Hasen is even more bullish, 
concluding that
corporate vote buying is efficient and would 
not increase agency
problems. 175 Even if these commentators are 
correct that collective
action problems can be overcome, however, the 
fix might require reg-
ulation. Levmore argues that "early sellers [might need 
to] be pro-
tected . . . if prices rise.
1 76 While it may be possible to solve this
problem through charter amendment or statute 
or judicial review, as
169 See Susan E. K Christoffersen et al., 
The Market for Record-Date Ownership 7
(July 4, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract--
302522.
170 Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 
53 STAN. L. REv. 111, 123-41 (2000).
171 Id. at 123.
172 Id. at 121-41.
173 Id. at 139.
174 Id.
175 Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. 
L. REv. 1323, 1370 (2000).
176 Levmore, supra note 170, at 139.
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Levmore suggests, each of these mechanisms has the potential to be
quite costly.
Prediction markets can avoid many of these issues, achieving the
same goals with little additional costs. In a prediction market, no indi-
vidual shareholder is forced to make an early decision about whether
to sell, and the danger that someone might seek to buy up votes to
advance private interests, not to the benefit of shareholders generally,
is altogether avoided. The prediction market will update continu-
ously until the market closes, not only relieving the pressure on indi-
vidual choice, but also embedding more information into the price
through continuous participation. Vote buying markets, in contrast,
are able to capture less information because early sales, which by defi-
nition are based on incomplete information, freeze some percentage
of the vote in an informationally stale state. The prediction market
can avoid ex post litigation over the sale of early votes, but also cap-
ture all information between the time the market is announced and
its close, as opposed to a decreasing percentage of available
information.
A final benefit of prediction markets is that there is less potential
for manipulation. The concerns above about transparency (Hu &
Black)177 and early sellers (Levmore)1 7s hint at the possibility that
sophisticated investors and corporate raiders or activists may be able
to structure offers or arrange transactions that effectively disen-
franchise shareholders or buy their votes at significantly reduced
prices. While Levmore is right that regulation (both ex ante and ex
post) can prevent some manipulation, it may be under- or overinclu-
sive and will be costly in any event.
B. Personnel
1. Board Member Selection
A corporate law issue of perennial and especially contemporary
concern is who should nominate directors, how long they should
serve, and what percentage of votes is needed to win a director elec-
tion. In the ongoing battle over who has power in firms-sharehold-
ers or managers-these issues take center stage. This is because
defenders of the status quo of manager power point to board elec-
tions, either regularly or in proxy fights, as providing managers with
disciplinary oversight. The Delaware courts have proclaimed: "The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
177 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
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legitimacy of directorial power rests."' 9 Critics view the elections, in
which directors are nominated solely by management and need only a
plurality of votes to win, as ineffective to constrain managers.18
The battle over director elections is currently being waged on two
fronts: in the SEC, through a proposal to allow shareholders to nomi-
nate one or two rival directors for inclusion on the firm's proxy under
certain circumstances,' 8 1 and in the increasingly popular precatory
proposals calling for amendments to firms' bylaws requiring directors
to win a majority of votes for election.18 2 Both of these approaches
could be improved through prediction markets technology. Markets
could be used at a minimum to evaluate the merits of the precatory
proposals and to determine whether to allow rival directors proposed
by shareholders on the ballot.
Just as conditional markets can be used to assess shareholder pro-
posals and inform shareholders about their likely effects on stock
prices, so too could conditional markets be used to inform sharehold-
ers about the consequence of electing different directors. A corpora-
tion, for example, might establish a policy of using conditional
markets to assess the stock price effects of elections of particular direc-
tors and to include this information on the proxy sent to sharehold-
ers. The corporations most likely to do this would be those confident
that the official management recommendations in fact will be viewed
by the prediction market as best for shareholders, but if the approach
proves successful, shareholders might press other corporations to fol-
low suit. Because the effect of the election of a single director may in
some cases be small, the conditional markets should probably predict
the immediate effect on stock prices of the announcement of the
director or, more likely, a slate of directors, rather than the long-term
impact of the selection. 8 3
These markets will likely prove most valuable in cases in which
there is an open conflict between management and shareholders over
the board, and where the addition of one or a few board members is a
179 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. 1988).
180 See Bebchuk, supra note 112, at 851-56.
181 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAw. 43, 47 & n.12 (2003) (commenting on Security Holder Director Nominations,
68 Fed. Reg. 60, 784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249, 274)).
182 See Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS Announces New Policy on Majority
Voting, http://wwwissproxy.com/governance/publications/2005archived/037.jsp
(last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (noting that eighty such proposals were made in the first
six months of the proxy season, and announcing support for these proposals).
183 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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sign of a broader shift in power within the firm. The 
recent battle at
the Walt Disney Company between CEO Michael 
Eisner and dissident
shareholders provides a good example of a case 
in which the impact
of a single director's election could be measured. 
In effect, the ques-
tion before Disney shareholders was how much 
power the CEO
should have vis-A-vis the board, and the outcome 
of the election of
directors seemed likely to have a significant 
impact on the firm's
future. 184
2. Manager Hiring and Firing
Prediction markets may be somewhat less useful 
in the selection
of managers compared with the selection of 
directors. Hiring prac-
tices for senior management positions are typically 
shrouded in confi-
dentiality. CEO candidates from other firms 
do not want their
potential interest publicly known, and internal 
candidates too might
be less willing to be considered if there is a risk 
that it will be known
that they sought and were refused particular 
positions. This does not
mean that prediction markets can have no role 
in the process. Where
specific candidates have been widely speculated 
about, a corporation
(or a group of interested shareholders) might use prediction 
markets
to make an assessment. Similarly, one might imagine 
a nonprofit,
such as a university, using a prediction market 
to assess which poten-
tial president will have the most success in increasing 
the institution's
endowment or ranking.
A corporation also might run a prediction market 
with participa-
tion limited to members of a search committee 
or search firm, to
improve the chance that the search firm in fact 
recommends the can-
didate that members of the committee believe 
most likely to increase
shareholder welfare. Prediction markets can be 
designed to give small
numbers of individuals incentives to share their 
reasons for particular
positions, and so a market can serve as the locus 
of small group delib-
eration.1 5 Prediction markets also might be 
used to select among
possible search firms or search committees.
We believe, however, that prediction markets 
may be more useful
for assessing the impact of the departure, voluntary 
or involuntary, of
an executive, such as the CEO.
18 6 In this case, the identity of the rele-
vant official is already obvious, and so there is no 
difficulty associated
184 CalPERS Won't Vote in Favor of Disney CEO, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2005, at C4.
185 See Abramowicz, supra note 41, at 938-39.
186 In an unpublished work, Robin Hanson 
has explored the possibility of using
prediction markets in this way. Robin Hanson, 
Markets for Telling CEOs to Step
Down, (April 26, 1996), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/dumpceo.html.
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with secrecy. The magnitude of the impact is also potentially very
large, based on recent high-profile CEO departures. 187 The problem
for firms, which prediction markets can solve, is that this impact was
seen only after the decision was announced. While a firm may have
had some information, based say on interviews with investment bank-
ers or analysts, that the stock price would increase after the decision,
prediction markets would provide a powerful tool that would increase,
on the margin, the number of cases in which firms could make a
value-increasing decision about which manager to run the firm.
Such markets in effect would provide a real-time continuous mea-
surement of the market's assessment of the expected future perform-
ance of a particular official. While the general stock price measure of
a firm may help discipline CEO actions, making officials less likely to
make value-decreasing decisions, prediction markets focused directly
on the CEO could be considerably more powerful. Such markets
would assess the degree to which a corporation's future anticipated
success is dependent on a particular official. Even the CEO of a cor-
poration that happens to be successful for reasons having little to do
with the CEO would have to strive to establish personal value. We
recognize, of course, that few CEOs will decide to implement such
markets, and, as with many of this Article's proposals, such markets
may be feasible only in the long run, if prediction markets gather suf-
ficient momentum. Once again, however, shareholders or outsiders
interested in the corporation's performance themselves might estab-
lish this type of prediction market.
As in the case of director elections, the cases in which such mar-
kets may be most useful are the extreme cases in which a power strug-
gle within a firm is open and notorious. The recent battle at Disney is
again informative. The struggle for control of Disney was effectively a
referendum on the leadership of CEO Eisner. Dissident directors and
shareholders waged a multi-part campaign to oust Eisner, including
precatory proposali on board elections, a proxy fight, a public rela-
tions campaign, and several shareholder derivative suits alleging Eis-
ner and his cronies were paid excessive and wasteful compensation.
The battle was long, expensive, and, most important, based on little
more than speculation about Eisner's value and what impact his
departure would have. A prediction market might be able to short-
circuit much of this by trying to get a consensus answer to that specific
question.
187 Matt Krantz, Ousting CEOs Often Boosts Stock Price, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2005, at
I B (noting that stocks rally 3.5 percent, on average, when underperforming CEOs are
forced out).
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3. Executive and Board Compensation
There is a natural transition from discussions of CEO value to
questions about compensation, since the two theoretically should be
related. The simplest use here could be simply as a means of aggre-
gating information about compensation levels and practices to the
market. Much of the academic and media criticism is aimed at the
ability of executives, through convoluted pay packages, to conceal the
true amounts of compensation. 18 A market that estimates the total
value to an executive, and therefore the total cost to the firm, would
solve this problem. The value of many elements of an executive's
compensation-like options-are highly uncertain. The best availa-
ble tools, like the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options, are of
questionable accuracy and are difficult to apply in practice, even when
the details of compensation are disclosed.18 9 A simple prediction
market approach might predict the value that an analyst chosen at
random would assign to a pay package.
More ambitiously, prediction market assessing the stock market
implications of a particular executive's departure itself provides a
baseline for assessing that executive's compensation. At least, it would
seem that corporations generally should not pay executives more than
their value to the corporation, unless the corporation has precommit-
ted to doing so. Conditional prediction markets provide a way of mea-
suring the value of executives relative to the next best alternatives.
This may be valuable in deciding how much to pay particular execu-
tives. For example, if a prediction market estimates that the stock
price would increase upon an executive's departure, it would suggest
that the executive was overpaid. If, on the other hand, the market
predicts a stock price decrease upon an executive's departure, it sug-
gests that the executive is not overpaid.
Prediction markets also might be used to assess the possibility of
making discrete changes in compensation packages, for particular
employees. For example, a corporation might use a conditional pre-
diction market to assess the impact on stock price of different possible
changes to compensation, including different levels of decreases and
raises and different baskets of cash, stock options, and perks. 190 Such
188 See, e.g., LuciAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WiTtouT PERYORMANcE 67-70
(2004); Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay, Hiding Behind Small Print, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2004, § 3, at 1.
189 See, e.g., Craig Schneider, Forget Black-Scholes?: Why the Traditional Option-Pricing
Model May Not Be the Best Way to Value Employee Grants, CFO MAG., May 2004, at 45.
190 See generally M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A
Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835,
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markets would factor in that higher compensation 
increases the
probability that the corporation will 
be able to retain the particular
official and to attract officials in the future. A prediction 
that the cor-
poration would be best off docking someone's salary 
would indicate
either that the corporation would be best off pushing 
the official out
the door or that the financial savings would be 
worth any increased
risk of a departure.
Prediction markets also might facilitate contracting 
about salary.
The literature describes this primarily 
as an agency cost problem.
1 91
Managers generally control the pay-setting process, 
appoint the board
that sets their salary, and control the information 
that flows to the
board. Recently, there have been questions about 
the independence
of outside firms that consult on executive 
compensation matters,
192
and some outside firms might assert their independence 
by relying in
part on models derived from prediction markets. 
In addition, predic-
tion markets could be used as a supplement or 
alternative to existing
compensation mechanisms. Corporations today 
sometimes reward
top officials in part with stock options because 
such options will pro-
duce desirable incentive effects. But this is an 
imperfect device, as an
increase in a corporation's stock price may not 
necessarily be attribu-
table to any particular director or CEO's contributions.
19 3 Although
some stock option plans seek to control for this 
by basing compensa-
tion on the performance of a corporation relative to 
its competitors,
this too is imperfect. Even some portion of firm-specific 
performance
may be attributable to factors other than CEO 
performance; perhaps
a firm simply happened to be lucky in stumbling 
into a lucrative busi-
ness. An alternative is for a firm to contract 
specifically to base
bonuses on prediction market assessments of 
the CEO's value, for
example based on conditional predictions of the 
stock price effect of
the CEO's possible departure.
1863-67 (2005) (explaining why it may be optimal for firms 
to give executives perks
rather than just cash).
191 Id. at 1842.
192 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 188, 
at 37-39; see also Gretchen Morgen-
son, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay May Not Be So Independent, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at
Al.
193 There is a robust academic debate about 
how much of CEO compensation is
based on "skill." Compare Robert Daines et al., 
The Good, the Bad and the Lucky: CEO
Pay and Skill 26-27 (Inst. for Law & Econ., Unv. Pa. Law Sch., 
Paper No. 05-07, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622
2 2 3 (finding that CEOs with low skills are
often overpaid, while CEOs with high skills are 
significantly underpaid), with Mari-
anne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs 
Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without
Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 908 (2001) ("lW]hile CEOs 
are always rewarded for
good luck, they may not always be punished for 
bad luck.").
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These markets are, for the theoretical and practical reasons cited
above, likely to be superior to various reform measures proposed to
address alleged problems in how executives are paid. In Pay Without
Performance, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried claim that high agency
costs allow managers (who have the power and the incentives to care
about compensation) to extract more than the optimal amount from
shareholders. 194 They propose various governance reforms-such as
shareholder access to the proxy, increased independence of boards,
and so on-as mechanisms for constraining managerial power and
overreaching. 9 5 More moderately, Jeffrey Gordon proposes requir-
ing firms to disclose more detail about their pay philosophy and
approach in a narrative in firms' disclosure documents-to be called
"Compensation Discussion and Analysis." 196 Both proposals seek to
reduce agency costs by increasing shareholder power, either through
monitoring and governance roles or through increased information
provision. Others have argued, however, that shifting the balance of
power within firms from managers to shareholders will impose large
costs, while providing only speculative benefits from reduced compen-
sation. 197 Disclosure requirements are also costly, and have been
shown in the compensation area to be fraught with unintended conse-
quences. 98 Prediction markets, on the other hand, can help reduce
agency costs, without these potentially costly changes to corporate
governance.
Prediction markets have the potential not only to create new pro-
cedures for determining salaries, but also for lowering the amounts
that top managers are paid. The current model of executive compen-
sation rewards top managers richly based on the assumption that it is
their decisionmaking skills that create or destroy shareholder value. A
greater role in firm decisionmaking for prediction markets will neces-
sarily require a reassessment of the compensation scheme and what is
needed to attract, motivate, and retain top managers. As decision-
making becomes more diffuse, one might expect the pay of managers
to decrease, as their role becomes, on the margin, less important.
In the extreme case, where these markets are so effective that
they are contractually or legally delegated as the decisionmaker, the
194 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 188, at 15-17.
195 Id. at 201-16.
196 SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's a Problem, What's the Rem-
edy ? The Case for "Compensation Discussion and Analysis, "30 J. Con. L, 675, 695 (2005).
197 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 1751.
198 For a discussion of the pros and cons of disclosure, see Edward M. lacobucci,
The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 489, 497-503
(1998).
1408 [VOL. 82: 4
2007] PREDICTION MARKETS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
manager's role, and hence compensation, should look substantially
different from today. For example, fewer options or other contingent
compensation may be needed, since decisionmaking incentives are
less important; this might have the impact of dramatically reducing
total compensation, since the bulk of CEO pay, and nearly all of the
growth in pay over the past several decades, is based on incentive com-
pensation. Indeed, fewer managers may be needed, if many decisions
are delegated to prediction markets. In effect, managerial skills can
be outsourced through prediction markets, instead of obtained only
through employment relationships.
The skills valued in top managers may evolve in ways that are dif-
ficult to predict. For example, future managers may spend more time
managing these markets and their impact on a firm, both internally
and externally. Not only may these markets fundamentally change
how individual employers do their work and are motivated, but they
have the potential to create rivalries or be destructive to teamwork
and morale. Managers, meanwhile, will still have to figure out how to
implement the recommendations of the markets. Much of the work
of executives is not knowing what to do, but doing it-that is, muster-
ing the internal will and playing the right internal political cards to
make sure the policy is well executed. These essential traits of today's
managers will still be required, and insofar as today's compensation
schemes are about execution, we should expect less change.
C. Creditors and Other Nonshareholder Constituencies
So far, we have assumed that firms would use prediction markets
to maximize stock price, to the benefit of the firm's equity holders.
But it also might be possible for prediction markets to forecast effects
on other capital providers, like creditors, and even other stakeholders,
like, most importantly, labor. We will bracket the normative question
of if and how much firms should take the views of other firm constitu-
encies into account in decisionmaking, and focus for now on how
these various constituencies can most efficiently be included in corpo-
rate decisionmaking. Prediction markets could be useful in two ways.
First, they could enhance monitoring of the firm's activities by one or
more of these groups. Second, they could facilitate contracting
between shareholders and these other constituencies, allowing the
firm to commit to taking their interests into account, at least to some
degree, in making decisions.
I4o9
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1. Creditors
The potential for prediction markets to reduce agency costs
applies not just for shareholders but creditors as well. When firms
finance projects partially with debt, such as bonds and loans, a poten-
tial for conflict arises between lenders on one hand and managers and
shareholders on the other. Actions that may increase the value of
shares-like investments in risky projects and payment of dividends-
will decrease the value of the firm's debt. Shareholders, generally
including managers, may therefore prefer some risks that decrease
overall corporate value, including the value of both equity and debt.
Shareholders receive more of the upside from such actions than they
bear of the downside. The potential losses from such actions and the
costs that lenders and borrowers expend to reduce these risks are
known as the agency costs of debt.19 9
Lenders use contractual provisions, known as covenants, to try to
reduce these costs. Covenants, which can run to hundreds of pages,
routinely limit dividend payments, restrict the ability of a firm to take
on additional debt, and give lenders access to firm information that
allows them to prevent the firm from taking actions that would
prejudice creditors in favor of shareholders. 20 0 The benefit of cove-
nants is that they can reduce shareholder opportunism, lowering the
agency costs of debt for lenders. That in turn allows the firm to lower
its cost of capital. Covenants, however, are an imperfect oversight
device. They entail large monitoring and enforcement costs, and they
can prevent actions that can increase overall corporate value, that is,
increase the value of equity more than the decrease in the value of
debt.2H Covenants are costly because they can be over- or underinclu-
sive, and in any event, require lenders to collect, process, and inter-
pret incomplete data from the borrower.20 2 Covenants are costly even
for good quality borrowers, who, in an attempt to differentiate them-
selves from poor quality borrowers, will expend resources on aggregat-
ing data and persuading lenders about their compliance.
199 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 49, at 333-37.
200 Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 66-67 (1982).
201 Id.
202 Agency costs of debt are potentially exacerbated by tne recent growth in the
credit derivatives market, which allows lenders to sell the risk of particular loans to
third parties, such as hedge funds. As debt begins to look more diffuse, like equity,
lenders have less incentive to employ costly monitoring mechanisms. See Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2007) (manuscript at 17-20).
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The proposed academic solutions to these problems are, like
those proposed for shareholder agency costs mentioned above, largely
organizational in nature. For example, with respect to public bonds,
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan propose the cre-
ation of a "supertrustee" that has the power to "actively monitor, rene-
gotiate, and enforce bond covenants" 2 103 and that is paid pursuant to
an "incentive-based compensation scheme."20 4 As for bank debt,
scholars argue that banks should be limited in the types of services
they can offer lenders (to reduce potential conflicts of interest) and
should be prohibited from transferring the credit risk of their loans to
third parties, such as hedge funds (to maintain their incentive to
monitor).205
Prediction markets can help both lenders and borrowers reduce
the agency costs of debt by providing a complement to, or perhaps
even a substitute for, loan and bond covenants. There are three
increasingly ambitious possibilities. First, prediction markets can help
lenders monitor, and borrowers signal compliance with, existing loan
covenants. For example, corporate loan agreements typically include
"state-of-the-firm" covenants that require borrowers to maintain cer-
tain accounting and financial ratios, such as minimum net working
capital or specific ratios of debt to assets. Borrowers therefore com-
pile data on all of these metrics and report them to lenders. This
system entails the same collection and verification problems that we
saw above with other types of internal and external financial report-
ing. To reduce error costs and the potential for manipulation, the
borrower or lender could separately or together create prediction
markets that estimate the specific figures or, more simply, the likeli-
hood of the borrower's compliance with the covenants. Even with sig-
nificant subsidies, which might be needed to give participants
incentives to do research, these markets are likely to be a much less
costly mechanism for covenant monitoring.
The second possibility is that prediction markets could displace
the use of covenants all together. After all, the set covenants in a par-
ticular loan agreement is nothing more than a proxy for the question
the bank really cares about-will the bank get its money back?-and
there is no reason that prediction markets cannot be used to give an
estimate of this question. So instead of borrower and lender expend-
ing resources contracting over and monitoring covenants, they could
203 Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 447, 451 (1999).
204 Id.
205 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 202 (manuscript at 17-20).
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instead agree on a prediction market design that 
would estimate the
probability that the borrower would comply with the 
terms of the loan
agreement-that is, that the bank will get its money 
back. We can
imagine loan agreements that use prediction markets 
permitting lend-
ers an increasing level of involvement in the management 
of the firm
after the prediction market crossed various probabilities 
of default.
For example, when the prediction market estimates 
a twenty-five per-
cent chance of default, the lender may get authority 
for an inspection
of financial records and the right to limit the 
firm from taking on
additional debt; when the estimate reaches fifty 
percent, the lender
may get authority to restructure the debt, take 
a board seat, or
demand approval over major expenditures; and so on.
A final use of prediction markets would be to 
permit firms to
more efficiently consider the interests of lenders 
when evaluating pro-
ject choice or making other important corporate decisions. 
This
would allow borrowers to precommit to take into 
account the interest
of creditors in their decisionmaking, thereby enabling 
firms to lower
their overall cost of capital. Under current law, 
there is currently an
unresolved debate about if, when, and how firms 
have an obligation to
take the interests of creditors into account in corporate 
decisionmak-
ing. At one extreme-firms in the "zone of insolvency"-some 
courts
find a firm obligation to consider the joint interests of shareholders
and creditors or even to act as de facto trustees 
for creditors. 20 6 At all
times before then, creditor interests are protected 
primarily through
the contractual and monitoring mechanisms 
described above.2
0 7
Deploying prediction markets (either when the debt agreement 
is
signed or after some milestones are reached) to estimate 
overall cor-
porate value or specific value for creditors, would 
enable firms to
credibly precommit with simple contract terms 
to limit their own
actions in ways that will lower the risk for lenders.
2. Labor
Similar benefits are possible with regard to a firm's 
other impor-
tant constituencies as well. Some corporate law 
theorists have argued
that the board of directors should be viewed as 
an implicit contract
206 See, e.g., Geren v. Quantum Chem. Corp., No. 95-7554, 
1995 WL 737512 (2d
Cir. Dec. 13, 1995) ("Under New York law, directors of 
a corporation may become
trustees of the creditors when the corporation is insolvent."); see also Jewel 
Recovery,
L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) ("Delaware 
law recognizes
that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the assets 
of the corporation become a
trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors.").
207 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
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among a corporation's various constituencies. 208 On this theory, the
board's virtue is not that it will maximize shareholder wealth at every
turn, but that it will mediate among constituencies. The board's facili-
tation of "team production" in the long run is to the shareholders'
advantage, because the creation of the board allows shareholders to
commit to constituencies such as labor that the shareholders will not
take advantage of them later. For example, a board may be unlikely
to effect a broad layoff when doing so would increase profitability only
slightly. Such a commitment makes it easier for a firm to recruit work-
ers, thus increasing shareholder welfare ex ante even if it prevents
shareholder wealth maximization ex post.
Prediction markets can facilitate explicit contracts that may make
this function of a board less necessary. For example, a collective bar-
gaining agreement might provide protection against layoffs, except in
cases in which the layoffs are expected to have dramatically positive
benefits for stock price. A more elaborate approach might create a
prediction market that would forecast the effect of possible decisions
on the welfare of current workers, for example represented by the
average salaries of those workers a decade later, whether or not the
workers are with the firm. The firm might then contract to consider-
ing possible strategic changes to maximizing the joint welfare of share-
holders and labor, as determined by some weighting of this prediction
market with another market forecasting stock price. Less dramati-
cally, the firm might contract to avoiding strategic changes that would
greatly harm workers and only slightly benefit the firm.
Implicit contracts are crude devices. Explicit contracts can
reduce the danger of opportunistic behavior and the need for over-
broad protections against such behavior, thus increasing the potential
gains from contracting. Without prediction markets, however, there
would be no objective gauge of policy effects. If explicit contracting
relied on vague standards, -t might lead to expensive and unpredict-
able litigation. Alternatively, explicit contracting might rely on
detailed rules, and indeed labor contracts often do reflect this strat-
egy, making these contracts analogous to the elaborate covenants we
have seen between firms and debtholders. But as in other legal con-
texts, rules can be expensive to draft and may be both under- and
overinclusive. At least in some cases, prediction markets provide an
escape from this dilemma, avoiding the need for both vague standards
and detailed rules.
208 Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 33, 37-38 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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Prediction markets can facilitate explicit contracting 
not only
with broad constituencies such as labor, but also 
with particular con-
tracting customers, such as a customer or a particular 
manager. An
executive might not agree to join a corporation that uses 
prediction
markets to fire executives as soon as it is in 
the firm's interest, in
which case prediction markets might counsel 
against the use of pre-
diction markets for dismissal. But an executive 
might agree to a con-
tract that allows the executive to be fired only 
if the dismissal will
benefit the firm by a large amount. Such contracts 
can protect man-
agers and other key employees from arbitrary 
or opportunistic dismis-
sal, while allowing the firm to remove particularly 
bad performers.
CONCLUSION
Ronald Coase explained that firms look like 
they do because the
benefits of hierarchy and command-and-control 
exceed the sum of
agency and transaction costs.
20 9 Coase imagined that the boundaries,
and even existence, of firms would change as 
the costs of various orga-
nizational approaches changed.
210 Prediction markets have the
potential to profoundly reduce the costs of hierarchy 
while simultane-
ously reducing the costs of more decentralized 
organization
approaches. It is, of course, impossible to 
predict the impact these
markets will have, but it is possible that we will 
see a greater heteroge-
neity of governance models across firms or industries 
since prediction
markets provide added flexibility of model choice 
through reduced
costs. More fundamentally, the standard 
model-the Berle and
Means firm beset by large agency costs-may 
be in doubt as predic-
tion markets deploy the power of market information 
processing to
reduce agency costs within and outside of the 
firm.
209 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 
386, 392 (1937).
210 Id. at 395.
